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COMMENT

On Financial Sector Reform in Emerging
Markets: Enhancing Creditors' Rights and
Securitizing Non-Performing Loans in the
Indian Banking Sector-An Elephant's Tale
ANSHU S.

K. PASRICHAt

INTRODUCTION

For a greater part of 1980s and 1990s, policymakers
around the globe strived for financial liberalization in
emerging economies.' Financial globalization 2 brought in
t Editor-in-Chief, Buffalo Law Review, 2006-2007; Gilbert D. Moore Fellow,
State University of New York at Buffalo, 2003-2007; College of Arts & Sciences
Fellow, State University of New York at Buffalo, 2003-2007; Ph.D. Candidate,
University at Buffalo Department of Geography: International Trade &
Investments, expected 2008; J.D. Candidate, University at Buffalo Law School,
2007; M.S., Electrical Engineering, State University of New York at Buffalo,
2003; B.E., Electronics & Communications Engineering, Maharshi Dayanand
University, India, 2001. I would like to thank Ms. Barbara D. Klippert, Partner,
McKee Nelson LLP, and Mr. Jim O'Neill, Managing Director & Head of Global
Economic Research, The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. for their remarks on an
earlier draft of this Comment; remaining errors are solely my responsibility. I
would also like to thank Dean R. Nils Olsen and Dr. Makau Mutua for their
mentoring and support in all of my endeavors at the University at Buffalo Law
School; I owe them a debt of sincere gratitude. I dedicate this Comment to my
parents. ©2007 by Anshu Pasricha, anshupasricha@gmail.com.
1. See LAWRENCE SAEZ, BANKING REFORM IN INDIA AND CHINA 1 (2004).

2. Financial globalization is not a new concept, however, the "depth and
breadth" of financial globalization that world has experienced in last three
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new participants, 3 and along 4with these new participants, a
"growing capital mobility." Simultaneously, regulators
around the globe continued their efforts to ensure the
health and stability of world banking and financial systems
in hopes of ensuring economic development for the third
world. 5 However, partly as a result of the financial crises
that ravaged countries worldwide 6-developed
economies

decades, and continues to experience, is "unprecedented." Sergio L. Schmukler
& Pablo Zoido-Lobat6n, World Bank, Financial Globalization: Opportunities
and Challenges for Developing Countries (May 30, 2001) (draft report, on file
with the Buffalo Law Review).
3. See generally DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING
HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE THAT IS
REMAKING THE MODERN WORLD (1998); The Commanding Heights: The Battle for
the World Economy (PBS television broadcast 2002).
4. Lawrence Sdez, Banking Reform in India and China, 6 INT. J. FIN. ECON.
235, 235 (2001).
5. One such effort, for example, was the Basel Committee's International
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, see BASEL
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (July 1988, updated Apr. 1998), "which

created for the first time an internationally accepted standard for assessing
levels of bank capital." The European Union's Financial Services Action Plan:
Implicationsfor the American Financial Services Industry Before the H. Comm.
on Financial Services, 107th Cong. 2-3 (2002) (statement of Mark W. Olson,
Member, Board
of Governors of the Federal
Reserve
System),
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/052202mo.pdf (last visited Feb. 19,
2007). Thus the 1988 Basel Capital Accord, or Basel I, as it is popularly referred
to, "formally recognized for the first time the need for international capital
requirements in order to address the increasingly global nature of financial
services." April K. Rinne, An Analysis of the Treatment of Asset Securitization
Under the Proposed Basel II Accord and the U.S. Banking Agencies' Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) 30 (Apr. 23, 2004) (unpublished
M.A.L.D. Thesis, Tufts University), available at http://fletcher.tufts.edu
research2004/Rinne-April.pdf. Since then, shortcomings of Basel I have become
apparent and negotiations for an enhanced accord, dubbed Basel II, are
currently underway. See id. at 32. These norms will come into effect in 2007.
Another such effort is the Basel Committee's Core Principles for Effective Bank
Supervision, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR
EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION (Sept. 1997) [hereinafter CORE PRINCIPLES],
which provides reference for banking supervision. For a summary of Core
Principles, see Andrea D. Roller, Thailand's Banking Crisis and Subsequent
Reform: Could Thailand Benefit From An InternationalStandard?,24 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 411, 436 & n.140 (2001).

6. E.g., U.S. savings and loans debacle, the Chilean banking crisis of the
1980s, the Argentine and Mexican crises in the mid-1980s and 1990s, as well as
the Asian financial crisis in 1997, which brought worldwide turmoil.
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and "emerging markets"' 7 alike-policymakers started
rethinking their approach to economic development.8 In
particular, the Asian financial crisis that affected Southeast
Asia 9 brought to the forefront weaknesses in the banking
7. The term "emerging markets" has become somewhat ubiquitous in the
financial literature. What is meant by "emerging" in such "emerging markets"
is, however, unclear. Some commentators argue that emerging markets are
instead "re-emerging" markets. See, e.g., William N. Goetzmann & Philippe
Jorion, Re-Emerging Markets, 34 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1, 1-2 (1999)
("[M]arkets tend to emerge, submerge, and re-emerge through time ... many of
today's emerging markets are actually re-emerging markets .... "); Emerging
Economies: Climbing Back, ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 2006, at 69, 70 ("The growing
clout of emerging economies is in fact returning them to the position they held
for most of history."). In any event, the term which was coined by the
International Finance Corporation, see id., is used to define "[financial] markets
in developing countries (low- and middle-income economies)." E. Han Kim &
Vijay Singal, Stock Markets Openings: Experience of Emerging Economies, 73 J.
Bus. 25, 28 n.7 (2000). This definition has become the basis of common usage of
the term "emerging markets" across the board.
8. During first half of the 1990s, "Washington consensus" came into vogue.
Coined by John Williamson of the Institute for International Economics, it
roughly meant that "free markets and sound money," Paul Krugman, Dutch
Tulips and Emerging Markets, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 1995, at 28, 29, were
the key to economic development. The Mexican crisis in 1994 discredited the
consensus, however. See id. at 31. For a brief discussion of the "Washington
consensus," see Center for International Development at Harvard University,
Consensus,
Washington
Homepage,
Negotiations
Trade
Global
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html (last visited Feb. 8,
2007).
9. The Asian financial crisis, or Asian Contagion, as it is popularly called,
Sebastian Edwards, Contagion (Revised Version of 1999 World Economy
Lecture, University of Nottingham, Oct. 28, 1999) (2000), available at
http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty/sebastian.edwards/world-economy5.pdf,
has been described as one of "the most serious financial crisis in a half a
century," Nicholas D. Kristof with Edward Wyatt, Who Went Under in the
World's Sea of Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1999, at Al (quoting President
William J. Clinton), and "something that has no parallel in human history," id.
(quoting David Hale, Chief Economist, Zurich Group). It primarily affected
countries that had, until then, enjoyed strong economic performance. These
countries, including the likes of Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia, along with

the "Four Tigers,"

see THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT / THE WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH

AND PUBLIC POLICY, at xvi (1993) (referring to Hong Kong, the Republic of
Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, China as the "four tigers"), were often dubbed as
the "miracle" economies, see, e.g., id., serving as models for fostering economic
growth in emerging markets, see, e.g., Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, Dealing with
Sovereign Liquidity Crises: New International Initiatives for the New World of
Volatile Capital Flows To and From Emerging Markets, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV.
807, 808 (1998) ("[The Asian so-called "tigers" were considered exemplars of
what liberalized (in terms of privatization of enterprise, removal of capital
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sector of Southeast Asia and the issue of banking reform. 10
This also changed the priorities for the policymakers as
they realized that micro- and macro-economic conditions
were equally important in a globally connected economy,"
and reforming international financial systems was essential
for global economic well-being. 12 More pertinent to the topic
of this Comment, the Asian financial crisis also provided a
glaring example for the Chinese and Indian economies to
correct course and set into motion policy changes that could
help them avert a similar disaster. Although China and

controls, not in terms of permitting access for foreign goods and services)
emerging market economies could achieve of rapid economic growth.").
However, the "miracle" faded with the Asian crisis, and academics and
policymakers went scurrying around to explain what went wrong, see, e.g., THE
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT / THE WORLD
BANK, RETHINKING THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE (Joseph E. Stiglitz & Shahid Yusuf

eds., 2001), partly because the Asian financial crisis threatened to bring about a
total change in the direction of reforms in these previously fast liberalizing
economies. It is, of course, debatable whether the economic growth experienced
by these countries was a "miracle" in the first place. See, e.g., Paul Krugman,
The Myth of Asia's Miracle, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 62; Michael S.
Bennett, Banking Deregulation in Indonesia, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 443
(1995) (arguing that changes to the regulatory framework of the Indonesian
banking system since 1988 had left the banking sector in a precarious
situation); see also Paul Krugman, Whatever Happened to the Asian Miracle?,
FORTUNE, Aug. 18, 1997, at 26. After the fact, several commentators realized
that signs of unsustainable growth were there before the crisis hit Asia, but
policymakers and private interests both chose to continually ignore them. For a
brief account of the crisis, see Nicholas D. Kristof, Global Contagion: A
Narrative,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15-18, 1999, at Al (a series of four articles providing
"a narrative of the worldwide financial crisis that . . . illustrates how
globalization increasingly stitches lives all over the world into a single economic
quilt."). For a brief but more scholarly account and analysis, see also John W.
Head, Global Implications of the Asian Financial Crisis: Banking, Economic
Integration, and Crisis Management in the New Century, 25 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 939 (1999); Michael S. Bennett, Banking Deregulation in Indonesia: An
Updated Perspective in Light of the Asian Financial Crisis, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 1, 4 n.16 (1999) (citing various sources that discuss the Asian financial
crisis).
10. Siez, supra note 4 at 235; see also, Head, supra note 9.
11. Dilip K. Das, Asian Crisis: Distilling CriticalLessons 11 (United Nations
Conf. on Trade & Dev., Discussion Paper No. 152, 2000), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/dp_152.en.pdf.
12. See, e.g., Stanley Fischer, Financial Crises and Reform of the
InternationalFinancialSystem (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 9297, 2002).
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India were spared in this crisis, 13 there was a realization
that Chinese and Indian banking sectors faced problems
similar to those faced by the Southeast Asian economies
during the build-up to the Asian crisis. 14
The problems that afflicted the Indian banking sector in
particular were predominantly a result of decades of
"directed
credit"
policies
of
successive
Indian
13. As Mr. Jim O'Neill, see dagger footnote, remarked upon reading an
earlier draft, "why did India avoid the Asian crisis?" is an important question.
Email from Jim O'Nell, Managing Director & Head of Global Economic
Research, The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., to Anshu S. K. Pasricha, Editor-inChief, Buffalo Law Review (Nov. 29, 2006, 04:34:00 EST) (on file with the
Buffalo Law Review). I thought about it carefully before deciding that it would
be beyond the scope of this Comment to try to answer that question. However, I
speculate, based in part upon Mr. O'Neill's remarks, that perhaps because of
the shorter time duration since the financial liberalization had started in
earnest in India, by 1997 there was not enough "flighty" investment in Indian
economy so as to affect it as brutally as it did Thailand and other countries. See
id. ("Is it because foreign investors had not been involved, and/or there was
little speculative investor focus?"). It is also possible that the Indian banking
system-because regulatory reform had not yet been completed-was still
under the strict foreign exchange regulatory regime, and was therefore immune
to a certain extent to such exogenous shocks. See id. ("Or was it something
inherently stronger about the system in India?"). See also infra note 14. It is, of
course, as I concede, mere speculation, and perhaps more suited to a proper
discussion in another article.
14. Sdez, supra note 4, at 243. For the purposes of this Comment, although I
primarily focus on the non-performing loans in the banking sector, an
experienced reader can sense that there is another set of pertinent issues
always in the subtext: the issue of Asian economies' over-dependence on the
banking sector in the course of economic development. Most Asian economies,
especially those of China and India, enjoy a very high savings rates. Households
continue to save almost a third of GDP, on an average, across Asia. These are
"lent on" by the banks, and to make a logical jump, as such discussion is beyond
the scope of this Comment, there is under-utilization of capital markets. To put
things in perspective, the average size of bond markets in Asia remained under
twenty percent of regional GDP, while that of United States is over hundred
percent of GDP. Result of such reliance on the banking sector is a high-leverage
financial structure which cannot absorb exogenous shocks-and perhaps even
endogenous ones-efficiently, resulting in crises. This implies that among other
things, a strong debt market is helpful in strengthening the economy. See also
Alan Greenspan, infra note 234. For a discussion of the economic benefits of a
strong debt market, see generally GUnther F. Br6ker, Strategies for the
Development of a Viable and Efficient National Bond Market, in ORGANISATION
FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, EMERGING BOND MARKETS IN
THE DYNAMIC ASIN ECONOMIES 9, 14-17 (1993); Assad Jabre, A Strategic
Priority for Emerging Markets, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION,
BUILDING LOCAL BOND MARKETS: AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 39 (Alison Harwood ed.,

2000).
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governments. 15 During much of the second half of the
twentieth century, the Indian banking sector had
characteristics of social control. 16 The supposed role the
banking sector played in the economy was that of providing
financial support for preferred sectors1 7 which would
purportedly lead to development of the country.' 8 However,
because of inefficient lending practices, combined with poor
monitoring, perhaps even corruption,19 the Indian banking
sector became saddled with huge folios of non-performing
loans. In fairness to Indian policymakers, they realized the
weaknesses in their banking sector before the Asian
financial crisis, and had already instituted committees for
understanding the problem. 20 However, the Asian financial
crisis only served to increase the urgency in the Indian
policy circles. Over the course of the 1990s, in order to clean

15. See infra Part I.B. As a side note, such directed credit policies were
perhaps necessary in the predominantly rural economy so as to provide the
small farmers with funds necessary to support their farming ventures.
Therefore, I hope that I do not stir a hornet's nest as I delve into the effects of
such policies on the banking sector's health as a matter of economics without
going into the details of "need" or social merit of such policies. See also infra
note 24.
16. The policy was formally announced only in 1967. See infra Part I.B.
17. See infra Part I.B.
18. The financial system in India-at least in the latter half of last
century-depended heavily on the development finance institutions, which
provided financial assistance to large and small industrial concerns. Leading
development finance institutions in India were, and continue to be, the
Industrial Finance Corporation of India, Industrial Development Bank of India,
and the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (now ICICI). In
addition, the Small Industries Development Bank of India, SIDBI, was created
in 1989 to provide "financial assistance leading to the promotion, financing, and
development of small-scale projects and microenterprises." SAEz, supra note 1,
at 43.
19. Although discussion of the malaise that afflicted Indian banking sector
during the times the economy was protected is outside the scope of this
Comment, in general social control and the policy of directed lending led to the
huge folios of non-performing loans. See infra Part I.B. But see supra note 15.
20. See infra note 91; see also P. K. Bhattacharjee, NPA Management Perform or Perish, CHARTERED FIN. ANALYST, Oct. 1999, at 51; A. V. Rajwade,
Verma Panel Report: A Bitter Pill to Swallow, CHARTERED FIN. ANALYST, Nov.
1999, at 37; Katuri Nageswara Rao, NPAs: Ground Realities, CHARTERED FIN.
ANALYST, Apr. 2000, at 43; Archana Anmol Singh, Weak Public Sector Banks:
SOS for Revival, CHARTERED FIN. ANALYST, Apr. 1999, at 49; S.
Venkitaramanan, Bank Restructuring and Asset Reconstruction, CHARTERED
FIN. ANALYST, Nov. 1999, at 39.
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up its banking system, the Indian government embarked
upon major regulatory reform by instituting a series of
smaller steps. 21 Most recently, among other things, the
Indian government has allowed banks 22 and financial
institutions 23 to securitize non-performing assets (NPAs).
Part I lays out the present structure of the Indian
banking sector, while also providing a quick overview of the
policy of "social control" leading to nationalization of some
private commercial banks in India. It is important to
understand the policy of social control because it is often
argued that the era of "social control" that led to the policy
of "directed credit" was one of the primary reasons for the
buildup of NPAs in the Indian banking sector. 24 Part I also
explains how the problem of non-performing loans has been
plaguing the Indian banking sector, and details some steps

21. See infra Part I.D.
22. See infra note 200 and accompanying text for a definition employed in
the regulatory scheme in India.
23. See infra note 201, and accompanying text for a definition employed in
the regulatory scheme in India.
24. I do not consider here whether this argument has merit to it or not.
However, government ownership of banks has been viewed with some optimism
by several scholars, most notably by Alexander Gerschenkron. See generally
ALEXANDER

GERSCHENKRON,

ECONOMIC

BACKWARDNESS

IN

HISTORICAL

PERSPECTIVE: A BOOK OF ESSAYS (Harvard University Press 1962) (arguing that
in countries like Russia, there was severe scarcity of capital, which coupled with
dismal standards of honesty in business meant that only the government could
fulfill the function of providing industrial credit). This school of thought thus
focuses on the role of government in controlling finance, and boosting economic
growth. These ideas became the hallmark of economic policy in Asia and other
developing regions in 1960s and 1970s. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al.,
Government Ownership of Banks, 57 J. FIN. 265, 266 (2002); see also, infra Part
I.B. However, the alternate view, the so-called political view of state banks
holds that public ownership of banks provides "an effective means for politicians
to influence the allocation of credit, allowing them to support firms and
enterprises that may further their political interests." P. Demetriades & S.
Andrianova, Finance and Growth: What We Know and What We Need to Know
at
Paper,
2003),
available
(U.
of
Leicester
Working
16
http://www.le.ac.uk/economics/research/RePEc/lecfleecon/dp03-15.pdf. It seems
that, in India at least, post-nationalization of banks in 1969, see infra Part I.B,
competitive environment was adversely affected. See V.R. Panchamukhi,
Lessons From the National Experience of India in Mobilizing Domestic and
External Resources for Economic Development, 8 ASiA-PACIFIC DEV. J. 69, 79
(2001), available at http://www.unescap.org/drpad/publication/journal 8_1/
PANCHAMU.PDF. The profitability of banks started declining and nonperforming assets increased. See id.
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that successive Indian governments have undertaken to
resolve the problem. Part II discusses asset securitization,
first generally, and then non-performing loans as the
specific underlying asset class. Part III examines the
current
Indian
securitization
legislation,
focusing
predominantly on the scheme adopted in SARFAESI,25 but
also referring to the other legislative-judicial actions 26 that
have helped the banking sector to clean up their portfolios
of non-performing loans. Part III also addresses some of the
systemic problems for securitization in India that may
threaten the nascent asset-backed securities market in
India.
I conclude this Comment by claiming that, despite the
problems that exist in the current Indian experimentation,
securitization of NPAs has been a positive development for
the Indian banking sector. Not only has this law helped
strengthen the banking sector by clearing up funds for more
lending, but it has also provided an impetus to the
development of a stronger fixed income market in India
which has the potential to have considerably more depth
than its regional counterparts. Such a market is important
for a developing economy like India's so as to provide an
alternative avenue of funding for industry.
This Comment thus argues that securitization-enabling
legislation by Indian lawmakers is not just an exercise in
providing a stop gap solution to the problem of nonperforming loans in the Indian banking sector. As noted
elsewhere in this Comment, the current response in India
has shaped up over a decade,2 7 the result of a process that
started as early as 1991 when the first Narasimham
Committee 28 reported its findings regarding the state of the

25. See discussion infra Part III.A.
26. See discussion infra Part III.B.
27. While exhaustion of such a long period of time may be supportive of the
"elephant" moniker at first glance, it also means that the current policy
response is not some panicky measure. Rather, it seems that there has been
deliberation on Government of India's part, over several different political
alliances, and there is a well thought out strategy to make it easier for the
banks to take control of and dispose of the collaterals pledged for loans that
subsequently become non-performing.
28. See infra note 91.

2007]

AN ELEPHANT'S TALE

333

Indian banking sector. 29 Before reaching the current stage
of reforms, successive Indian governments encouraged
numerous reforms, albeit cautiously and therefore on a
much smaller scale, before determining the best course of
action to ensure the long term vitality of the Indian
banking sector. Therefore, in light of this discussion, it may
be argued that the current legislative response is a well
thought out one and, therefore, perhaps not an elephant's
tale after all. 30
29. See infra Part I.D.
30. In the current geo-econo-political lexicon, while India is occasionally
referred to as a "tiger," see, e.g., Simon Long, The Tiger in Front: A Survey of
India and China, ECONOMIST, Mar. 5, 2005, at 1; Claire Topal, China and India:

A Tiger Overtaking a Dragon (Feb. 7, 2005), http://fletcher.tufts.eduinews/
2005/02/schuerer.shtml, this portrayal is perhaps better suited in the backdrop
of the "Four Tigers," i.e., Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and
Taiwan, China, which grew rapidly over the latter half of the twentieth century,
approaching the ranks of high income economies. See THE INTERNATIONAL BANK
FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT / THE WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN
MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY, at xvi (1993). However, other
commentators have also used the phrase "four little dragons" while discussing
the successful industrialization of these countries. See generally EZRA F. VOGEL,
THE FOUR LITTLE DRAGONS: THE SPREAD OF INDUSTRIALIZATION IN EAST ASIA
(1991); BRIAN KELLY & MARK LONDON, THE FOUR LITTLE DRAGONS (1989). These
"tigers," or "little dragons," along with other East Asian "miracle" economies, see
supra note 9, were admired for the financial liberalization and progress that
they made before the East Asian financial crisis. See generally YERGIN &
STANISLAW, supra note 3; The Commanding Heights: The New Rules of the
Game (PBS
television
broadcast
2002)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/lo/story/tr-menu_03.html).
However, when the talk is focused on China and India, the two "Asian Giants,"
Wolfgang Schiirer, A Geopolitical and Geo-economic Overview: On the Rise of
China and India as Two Asian Giants, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., 145, 145
(2005); NAT'L FOREIGN INTEL. BD., NIC 2000-02, GLOBAL TRENDS 2015: A
DIALOGUE ABOUT THE FUTURE WITH NONGOVERNMENT EXPERTS 34 (Dec. 2000),
and the "inevitable" comparisons are made, Simon Long, supra, at 3, "India is
often portrayed as an elephant: big, lumbering and slow off the mark." Id. at 4.
See generally ASHUTOSH SHESHABALAYA, RISING ELEPHANT (2005). The focus of
this Comment is primarily on the issue of non-performing assets in the Indian
banking sector and on the steps undertaken by the Indian policymakers to
resolve the problem. While I am not directly comparing Indian developments
with those in China, China did embark on certain similar reforms of the
banking sector in late 1990s. See Patrick J. Schena, Banks, Distressed Loans,
and the Development of Chinese Markets for Asset-Backed Securities, 29
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 35, 38 (2005); SAEZ, supra note 1, at 85-88; see also
generally NICHOLAS R. LARDY, CHINA'S UNFINISHED ECONOMIC REVOLUTION
(1998). I certainly stand for the proposition that based upon the discussion in
this Comment, one can successfully infer something: while Indian response to
the particular problem of non-performing loans on the bank balance sheets took
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And so... begins an elephant's tale. 31
I.

INDIAN BANKING SECTOR

Section A provides an overview of the general scheme of
regulation governing the Indian banking sector, as well as
the structure of the Indian banking sector while
emphasizing the evolution of the current state of public
sector banking in India.3 2 Section B briefly outlines the
Government
of India's policy of "social control,"
nationalization of some of the private commercial banks in
1969 and then again in 1980, as well as the ensuing policy
of "directed credit. '33 There is some evidence that this policy
has led to the high percentage of NPAs in the Indian
a long time in coming, it is a well thought-out response. This response has the
potential to free up ample funds for lending to the industry in India. This, of
course, given the global economic and political ambitions of India-at least as
portrayed in the context of its geo-econo-political rivalry with China-is
necessary. Therefore, I suggest that the readers be mindful of this subtext, and
of course the rivalry between the "Asian Giants" and draw their own
conclusions on what is a better moniker for India in light of my discussion in
this Comment. See also infra Conclusion.
31. It is not clear where and how the above referenced vocabulary of dragons
and elephants, see supra note 30, originated. If this is a result of some analyst's
imagination, who, while burning some midnight fluorescent, in moments of
boredom, engaged himself by assigning fantasy-land descriptions to countries
around the world, one can only wonder if he was aware of the mythical rivalry
of the Dragon and the Elephant as described in the bestiary manuscripts of the
medieval ages. See, e.g., THE BOOK OF BEASTS: BEING A TRANSLATION FROM A
LATIN BESTIARY OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY (T. H. White ed. & trans., 1954)
[hereinafter THE BOOK OF BEASTS]. According to a rather interesting description
that accompanies the illustrations of the Elephant and the Dragon in bestiary,
"[tihe dragon is the enemy of the elephant, and hides near paths where
elephants walk so that it can catch them with its tail and kill them by
suffocation. It is because of the threat of the dragon that elephants give birth in
the water." http://bestiary.ca/beasts/beast262.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2007);
see also THE BOOK OF BEASTS, supra, at 26. On bestiary, see generally, Willene
B. Clark & Meradith T. McMunn, Introduction to BEASTS AND BIRDS OF THE
MIDDLE AGES: THE BESTIARY AND ITS LEGACY 1, 1-11 (Willene B. Clark &

Meradith T. McMunn eds., 1989).
32. The choice of such focus is deliberate considering that only recently has
the private sector started reemerging as a strong force in the Indian banking.
For much of the duration of independent India, most of the banking activities
were undertaken by the public sector banks. See infra Part I.A. Consequently
most of the non-performing assets were also concentrated in the public sector
banks in India. See infra Part I.C.
33. See infra Part I.B.
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banking sector. This evidence is also briefly discussed. 34
Section C outlines the NPAs problem in the Indian banking
sector, and Section D details the initial steps undertaken by
the Government of India up until 2002 when it introduced
legislation to resolve the NPAs problem by securitizing
35
them through Asset Reconstruction Companies (ARCs).
A. The Structureof Indian Banking36
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is the central bank of
the country,37 regulating the operations of other banks,
managing money supply, and discharging other myriad
responsibilities that are usually associated with a central
bank. 38 The RBI was established on April 1, 1935, in

34. See infra Part I.B.
35. See infra Part I.D.
36. See generally RUSTOM S. DAVAR, DAVAR ON LAW AND PRACTICE OF

BANKING 1-37 (10th ed. 1965) (providing a detailed account of Indian banking
before and during the British rule); S. G. PANANDIKAR, BANKING IN INDIA (1934)
(providing a detailed account of origins of Indian banking).
37. The Reserve Bank of India is responsible for implementation of the
government's monetary policy. For a general overview of the bank and its
functions, see http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AboutusDisplay.aspx (last visited
Feb. 27, 2007). It is important for the reader to bear in mind that, in India,
although it is the RBI that discharges all the functions of a central bank, there
is another commercial bank operating by the name of Central Bank of India.
"Established in 1911, Central Bank of India was the first Indian commercial
bank which was wholly owned and managed by Indians." Central Bank of India,
http://www.centralbankofindia.co.in/home/profile/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
38. This is a rather simplistic summary of responsibilities borne by the
central bankers in India. RBI performs a wide range of "functions to support
national objectives," Reserve Bank of India: India's Central Bank,
http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AboutusDisplay.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
These specific functions, although generally in sync with the work of central
bankers around the world, are very much reflective of the intricacies of a
developing economy such as India's. Some of the specific tasks undertaken by
the RBI are:
1.

Formulating, implementing, and monitoring the monetary
policy so as to maintain price stability and ensure adequate
flow of credit to productive sectors.

2.

Regulating and supervising financial system by prescribing
the broad parameters of banking operations so as to maintain
public confidence, protect depositor's interest, and provide
cost-effective banking services to the public.
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accordance with the provisions of the Reserve Bank of India
Act 39 for the explicit purpose of functioning as a central
bank. 40 There was additional legislation before India's
independence primarily aimed at regulating the functioning
of banking companies and commercial banks. 41 Originally
privately owned, RBI was nationalized in 1948, postindependence from Britain, by the Reserve Bank (Transfer
to Public Ownership) Act, 42 and is now fully owned by the
Government of India. However, the most important piece of

3.

4.
5.

Managing foreign exchange under the Foreign Exchange
Management Act, No. 42 of 1999, so as to facilitate external
trade and payment and promote orderly development and
maintenance of foreign exchange market in India.

Issuing currency.
Acting as a banker to the Government of India and to all
scheduled banks.
See id.; see also DAVAR, supra note 36, at 510-12; THE BUSINESS GUIDE TO INDIA
127 (Jitendra Kohli ed., 1996).
39. The Reserve Bank of India Act, No. 2 of 1934 (as amended), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in/.
40. According to the Reserve Bank of India Act, No. 2 of 1934, the purpose of
the Reserve Bank was to "regulate the issue of Bank notes and the keeping of
reserves with a view to securing monetary stability in India and generally to
operate the currency and credit system of the country to its advantage."
Preamble, Reserve Bank of India Act, No. 2 of 1934 (as amended), available at
http://indiacode.nic.inl. Therefore, the Reserve Bank of India Act stipulated that
"[a] bank to be called the Reserve Bank of India shall be constituted for the
purposes of taking over the management of the currency from the Central
Government and of carrying on the business of banking in accordance with the
provisions of this Act." The Reserve Bank of India Act, No. 2 of 1934, (as
amended) §3 (1), available at http://indiacode.nic.in. On the role of the Reserve
Bank of India in affecting monetary management, as well as in furthering the
policy goals such as economic development (e.g., by selective credit control), see
generally, A. RAMAN, CENTRAL BANKING IN INDIA (1968); G. P. GUPTA, THE
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND MONETARY MANAGEMENT (1962).
41. Some of the provisions related to functioning of banking companies were
contained in the Indian Companies (Amendment) Act of 1936. Further, in 1946,
the British government passed the Banking Companies (Inspection Ordinance)
Act of 1946 and the Banking Companies (Restriction of Branches) Act, primary
purpose of which was to prevent the "indiscriminate branch expansion of
commercial banks." SAEZ, supra note 1, at 39.
42. The Reserve Bank (Transfer to Public Ownership) Act, No. 62 of 1948,
available at http://indiacode.nic.in; see The Reserve Bank of India: India's
Central Bank, http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AboutusDisplay.aspx (last visited
Feb. 18, 2007); see also RAMAN, supra note 40, at 21-32 (critiquing the
nationalization of central banking in India).
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legislation in the field of banking regulation also came soon
after Indian independence when the Banking Companies
Act of 1949 was passed. 43 This piece of legislation has since
become the "regulatory backbone of contemporary banking
regulation." 44 The RBI itself has a central45board of directors
that governs its decision-making process.
The complex network of institutions that comprise the
Indian financial system can be grouped under three
headings: commercial banking institutions, term-lending
institutions, and non-banking financial institutions. 46 The
commercial banking institutions are further classified into
Public Sector Banks (PSBs), Private Sector Banks, and
Foreign Banks. 47 Although increasing competition has

43. The Banking Companies Act was subsequently amended to read as the
Banking Regulation Act. The Banking Regulation Act, No. 10 of 1949, available
at http://indiacode.nic.in.
44. SAEZ, supra note 1, at 39. For a discussion of the regulatory scheme
embodied in the Banking Regulation Act, see R. S. GAE, THE BANK
NATIONALIZATION CASE AND THE CONSTITUTION 56-61 (1971).

45. The RBI has a Central Board, composition of which is directed by the
Reserve Bank of India Act, No. 2 of 1934 (as amended). Accordingly,
[t]he Central Board shall consist of the following Directors, namely:
(a) a Governor and not more than four Deputy Governors to be
appointed by the Central Government;
;
(b) four Directors to be nominated by the Central Government ....
(c) ten Directors to be nominated by the Central Government; and
(d) one Government official to be nominated by the Central
Government.
The Reserve Bank of India Act, No. 2 of 1934 (as amended) §8(1), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in/.
46. Siez, supranote 4, at 238.
47. Id. The Reserve Bank of India publishes a list of banks that operate in
the country. These are included in the Second Schedule of Reserve Bank of
India Act, No. 2 of 1934 (as amended). The Scheduled Banks are further divided
into subheadings of State Co-operative Banks, Urban Co-operative Banks, SBI
and Associates, Nationalized Banks, Private Banks, Foreign Banks, and
Gramin Banks. See The Reserve Bank of India Act, No. 2 of 1934 (as amended),
Second Schedule, available at http://indiacode.nic.in/; ANNUAL ACCOUNTS OF
SCHEDULED COMMERCIAL BANKS (Reserve Bank of India CD-ROM). Any bank

that is not included in this Second Schedule may be included according to the
criteria laid out in section 42 (6) (a) of the RBI Act. See DAVAR, supra note 36, at
507. Accordingly, RBI may direct the inclusion, in the Second Schedule, of
banks that are not already included so long as such banks "carr[y] on the
business of banking in India," and:
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reduced the dominance of PSBs in the Indian banking
49
sector, 48 PSBs still command a lion's share of the sector.

(i) ha[ve] a paid-up capital and reserves of an aggregate value of not
less than five lakhs [one lakh equals one hundred thousand] of rupees
[roughly forty-four rupees equal one U.S. dollar], and
(ii) satisf[y] the Bank [RBI] that its affairs are not being conducted in a
manner detrimental to the interests of its depositors, and
(iii) is a State co-operative bank or a company as defined in section 3 of
the Companies Act, 1956 or an institution notified by the Central
Government in this behalf or a corporation or a company incorporated
by or under any law in force in any place outside India[.]
Reserve Bank of India Act, No. 2 of 1934 (as amended) §42(6)(a), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in/.
Similarly, RBI also has the power to exclude any bank from the Second
Schedule, criteria for which are again laid bare in section 42 (6)(b). Accordingly,
the RBI may:
[D]irect the exclusion from... [the Second] Schedule ... any scheduled
bank...:
(i) the aggregate value of whose paid-up capital and reserves becomes
at any time less than five lakhs [one lakh equals one hundred
thousand] of rupees [roughly forty-four rupees equal one U.S. dollar],
or

(ii) which is, in the opinion of the [Reserve] Bank [of India,] after
making an inspection under section 35 of the Banking Regulation Act,
1949, conducting its affairs to the detriment of the interests of its
depositors, or
(iii) which goes into liquidation or otherwise ceases to carry on banking
business:
Provided that the Bank may, on application of the scheduled bank
concerned and subject to such conditions, if any, as it may impose,
defer the making of a direction under sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii) of
clause (b) for such period as the Bank considers reasonable to give the
scheduled bank an opportunity of increasing the aggregate value of its
paid-up capital and reserves to not less than five lakhs [one lakh
equals one hundred thousand] of rupees [roughly forty-four rupees
equal one U.S. dollar], or, as the case may be, of removing the defects
in the conduct of its affairs.
Reserve Bank of India Act, No. 2 of 1934 (as amended) §42(6)(b), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in/.
48. Since the liberalization of the Indian economy post-1991, the newer
entrants in the market, i.e., foreign banks, new private banks, and even old
private banks, have increased their share of the market at the expense of PSBs.
See M. G. Bhide et al., Emerging Challenges in Indian Banking 17 (Stanford
University Center for Research on Econ. Dev. and Pol'y Reform, Working Paper
No. 103, 2001), available at http://scid.stanford.edu/pdf/credprl03.pdf.
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Amongst these PSBs, a significant amount of banking
activity is undertaken by the State Bank of India and seven
associate institutions. 50 The four largest public banks in
India-State Bank of India, Canara Bank, Bank of India,
and Bank of Baroda-account for over ninety percent of
public banking assets. 51 An additional important sub-set of
the Indian PSBs is the group of nineteen nationalized
commercial banks. 52 The origin of these banks 53 illustrates,
in a rather elegant and spectacular fashion, 54 the tension
between public policy and private enterprise, especially in a
fledgling democracy 55 which56 faces the additional challenge
of an undeveloped economy.

49. Uday Bhasin, Challenges in India's Banking Sector, GT NEWS, Oct. 18,
2005, http://www.gtnews.com/article/6141.cfm ("[P]ublic sector banks constitute
the majority of the Indian banking system, be it by geographical reach or
deposit and credit volumes."); Bhide et al., supra note 48, at 16; SAEZ, supra
note 1, at 41 ("27 public sector banks account for . . . 90 percent of bank
branches of all scheduled commercial banks in India.").
50. The State Bank of India Group was formed in 1955 upon nationalization
of the Imperial Bank of India by introduction of the State Bank of India Act, No.
23 of 1955. 0. P. MATHUR, PUBLIC SECTOR BANKS IN INDIA'S ECONOMY: A CASE
STUDY OF THE STATE BANK 18 (1978). After India's independence, RBI held a
majority stake in eight banks, These banks were brought under the umbrella of
the State Bank of India group in 1959, as subsidiaries, following the enactment
of the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959. SAEZ, supra note 1, at
40. Of these eight subsidiary banks, two merged, and at present there are seven
banks in the State Bank Group, in addition to the State Bank of India. Id.
Although the State Bank of India group is considered the crown jewel of the
Indian banking sector, it is not considered in the same league as other big
names in international banking. See, e.g., BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND,
THE SMARTEST GuYs IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF

ENRON 164 (2003) ("So Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs-two of the most
prestigious names on Wall Street, investment banks with conservative lending
rules-sometimes found themselves consigned to Tier 3, with the likes of the
State Bank of India.").
51. Siez, supra note 4, at 238.
52. The Reserve Bank of India Act, No. 2 of 1934 (as amended), Second
Schedule, available at http://indiacode.nic.in/.
53. See infra Part I.B.
54. The episode was definitely spectacular, as is evident from the brief
account reproduced below. See infra note 71.
55. It seems that more than half a decade of democracy has not dispelled the
notion that, in India, there is always a tussle between policy objectives and
developmental objectives because of India being a democracy. This is not to
suggest that democracy is not conducive to development-at least that is not my
belief. See also infra. However, I may be in the minority in holding this view.
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B. Social Control, Bank Nationalization,and Directed
Credit
During the early years after India gained independence,
PSBs remained closely aligned with the development plans
of the Government of India. 57 The RBI, along with state
governments and sponsoring commercial banks, set up
Regional Rural Banks to develop the rural economy credit. 58
Thus, agricultural laborers, small farmers, artisans, and
other individuals contributing to the Indian development
cause were provided credit and other banking facilities by

This is because in recent times, when much comparison is being made between
the "Asian Giants," see supra note 30, it seems that it is fashionable to bemoan
the constraints of democracy in order to defend the slow pace of economic
growth in India as compared with China. See Carl Mortished, India Booms But
- Unlike China - Democracy Dulls the Tiger's Claws, GLOBE & MAIL (Ont.,
Can.), Feb. 9, 2006, at B17.
There is a lingering doubt that the Indian tiger will be roused from its
50-year sleep. India is not China; even as Sensex soars, the
government reached a deal with airport workers, promising them job
security after a five-day strike created stinking rubbish heaps. Where
China's despotic gerontocrats can bulldoze teeming slums for new
highways, India's leaders must negotiate.... It is the price India pays
for democracy.
Id.; see also Democracy's Drawbacks, ECONOMIST, Oct. 27, 2005, at 23, 24 ("[I]t
remains sadly true that the free market that has helped the tigers so much
often works better in Communist China than in India-not least thanks to
India's own democratically elected Communist politicians."); What's to Stop
India and China?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 27, 2005, http://www.economist.com/
printerfriendly.cfm?story-id=5084621 ("China is 'more focused than India, as a
democracy, can afford to be."' (quoting India's Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan
Singh)). Contra Interview by Alex Tribeli with Simon Long, South Asia Bureau
Chief of the Economist, ECONOMIST (Mar. 3, 2005), available at
http://www.economist.comlaudio/displaystory.cfm?story-id=3713784
(on file
with the Buffalo Law Review) ('There are far more checks and balances in the
Indian system than in the Chinese system.... There is no doubt that in looking
at India one has to ask the question whether that democracy, that freedom of
expression, acts as a constraint on growth, and my conclusion is no, not
necessarily.").
56. Indian independence from British rule, coming only on August 15, 1947,
was accompanied by a plethora of problems for the economy of India, which was
primarily agrarian, with a fledgling industrial sector. One such problem was
that of ensuring adequate credit extension to sectors such as agriculture and
small industries. See SAEZ, supra note 1, at 40.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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these Regional Rural Banks. 59 During these years-until
1969-private commercial banks continued to operate
freely 60 in an environment of a fairly liberal banking
regulatory scheme. 61 However, with time it came to be
commonly perceived 62 that these private commercial banks
63
were ignoring the agriculture and small industries sector,
and further, that 64
they were engaging in an otherwise
"corrupt" enterprise bordering on outright illegal conduct.
In order to correct this "perceived imbalance in the lending
practices of private banks,"65 the Government of India
decided on a policy of "social control" on the banking sector
66
on December 22, 1967 and later incorporated it into law.
Although the Government of India had high hopes from
the scheme of social control, the policy did not work as well
as the government had anticipated. This was partly because
the scheme related only generally "to the constitution of
board of directors, appointment of [bank's] chairman,

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. For example, there existed no controls on interest rates, and the reserve
requirements were low. See Panicos 0. Demetriades & Kul B. Luintel,
Financial Development, Economic Growth and Banking Sector Controls:
Evidence from India, 106 ECON. J. 359, 359 (1996).
62. Whether this perception was reality is not clear.
63. SAEZ, supranote 1, at 40.
64. MOHAMMAD QUDDUS, CONTROL OF COMMERCIAL BANKS IN INDIA

131

(1976). In a memorandum to the Government of India by the Indian Banks'
Association, following charges were leveled against the private banking sector:
(i) Banks have helped the concentration of economic power and
creation of industrial or business monopolies;
(ii) the resources of banks are being misused for
and their concerns;
(iii) bank credit is not being distributed in the
accordance with development priorities and
financing agriculturists, small borrowers or new

the benefit of directors
national interest or in
is not available for
entrepreneurs; and

(iv) bank finance is used to support anti-social or undesirable activities
like hoarding or speculation.
Id. & n.1 (citing Memorandum to Government by Mr. Krishnaraj-M.D.
Thakersey, Chairmanof Indian Banks'Association,ECON. TIMES (Bombay), July
12, 1967, at 1.).
65. SAEZ, supra note 1, at 40.
66. See infra note 71.
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appointment of auditors[,] and take-over of defaulting
banks by the government. ' 67 Thus, the policy did not fulfill
the objectives that the government had in mind, and misuse
68
of bank credit continued unabated under the scheme.
Because of this, the search for a new solution started in
earnest. Although the charges that were levied against the
private commercial banks before imposing social control
essentially related to "distribution of credit, '69 and the RBI
was adequately empowered under the existing law to
correct this imbalance, 70 the Government of India instead
chose to nationalize fourteen private commercial banks in
1969.71 While doing so, the Government of India made it

67. QUDDUS, supra note 64, at 133.
68. For an analysis of why the scheme failed, see id. at 136-37.
69. QUDDUS, supra note 64, at 132.
70. The Banking Regulation Act, No. 10 of 1949, available at
http://indiacode.nic.in, stipulated that RBI could determine policy "in relation to
advances[,] to be followed by banking companies generally or by any banking
company in particular, and when the policy [had] been so determined, all
banking companies or the banking company concerned . . . [were] bound to

follow the policy as so determined." § 21(1). The Banking Regulation Act also
bestowed unlimited powers upon the RBI to "formulate credit policy for the
guidance of banks .... [and to] give directions to banks with regard to matters
like purposes, margins, ceiling limits and rates of interest." QUDDUS, supra note
64, at 132. Finally, section 35A and section 36(1)(a) provided additional powers
to the RBI to act in the way in which it deems fit "in the interest of banking as
well as that of depositors and the public in general." Id. But see id. at 133
(arguing that RBI's lack of action was not without merit).
71. This process, as I noted before, see supra Part I.A, was rather
spectacular. Although the legal machinations of nationalization started on July
19, 1969, the ground work for this move was laid in 1967 at the All India
Congress Committee (AICC) session. See QUDDUS, supra note 64, at 131. This
session is the annual conference for the political party Congress which
remained in power through the majority of the early years of Indian
independence. The Government of India devised a scheme for social control
"aimed
at
introducing
structural,
organisational,
operational
and
administrative changes in the banking system .. .[so as] to make banks serve
wider national and social objectives." Id. Thus "Social Control" was imposed on
December 22, 1967, id. at 134, and was incorporated into law by the Banking
Regulation Act in 1968. Id. at 133. For a discussion of the scheme of social
control, see id. at 131-37. However, the policy failed to correct the perceived
imbalances in bank lending to various sectors. So on July 19, 1969, the
Government of India promulgated the Banking Companies (Acquisition and
Transfer of Undertakings) Ordinance, No. 8 of 1969, to nationalize certain large
banks. GAE, supra note 44, at 1. The Ordinance was challenged in the Supreme
Court of India. However, on August 9, 1969, before a judgment could be
rendered as to the Ordinance's constitutionality, the Parliament replaced it
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adequately clear that the role of banking in an economy
such as India's must be 'inspired by a larger social
purpose"' and must 'subserve national priorities and
objectives such as rapid growth in agriculture, small
industry, and exports."' 72 In 1980, another six banks were
nationalized, 73 bringing the total to nineteen nationalized
banks as included in the Second Schedule today. For the
next three decades, successive74 Indian governments pursued
the policy of "directed credit."
C. Build-up of NPAs in the Indian Banking Sector
After nationalization, banks were provided specific
mandates:
(a) Banks should expand their branch network to the different
parts of the country to cover rural areas and other remote areas
which do not normally have access to institutionalized facilities for
resource mobilization and resource supplies;
(b) banks [must] lend a stipulated proportion of their total
advances to selected pre-specified sectors like agriculture, small
with the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act,
No. 22 of 1969. Id. This Act, although different in some respects, incorporated
the same general scheme of the Ordinance. The nationalization saga continued
on for several months "arous[ing] great public interest and enthusiasm." Id. at
ix. The Act was, however, subsequently held void-in its entirety-by the
Supreme Court of India on February 10, 1970. See R.C. Cooper v. Union of
India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 564. The response from the Government of India was
swift, coming on February 14, 1970, in the form of the Banking Companies
(Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Ordinance, No. 3 of 1970. GAE,
supra note 44, at 171. This Ordinance was subsequently replaced by the
Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, No. 5 of
1970, on March 31st, 1970, and was given effect retroactively from July 19,
1969, the date of promulgation of the original Banking Companies (Acquisition
and Transfer of Undertakings) Ordinance. Id. at 171. This cleared the clouds
that hovered over the nationalization of private commercial banks. For a
detailed discussion and commentary on this episode, see generally, L. M.
SINGHVI, BANK NATIONALIZATION AND THE SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT (1971).

72. Abhijit V. Banerjee, Shawn Cole & Esther Duflo, Banking Reform in
India, in 1 INDIA POLICY FORUM 277, 277 (Suman Bery, Barry Bosworth &

Arvind Panagariya eds., 2004) (quoting Bank Company Acquisition Act, No. 22
of 1969.).
73. SAEZ, supra note 1, at 40.
74. Directed Credit is a term used to define the situation where "[1]ending
decisions are taken out of the realm of profit maximisation or economic concerns
and placed into the realm of politics." Mark Miller, Political Economy of
Directed Credit,http://www.ccsindia.org/policy/money/studies/wp0030.pdf.
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industries, rural development, social sectors, housing, and
backward regions and sections of society. This stipulation included
the provision of credit for special social security schemes, like the
Prime Minister's Rozgar Yogana (PMRY) and Jawahar Rozgar
Yogana; and
(c) banks were required to conform to the interest rates fixed by
the Reserve Bank of India as part of the overall monetary policy of
the Government. They were also required to adhere strictly to
various prudential norms such as cash reserve ratio and statutory
liquidity ratio, and75 invest in government securities as prescribed
from time to time.

Of particular importance among these specific
mandates is banks' obligation to lend to various specified
sectors. Therefore, banks "had to honor certain obligations
in terms of lending to priority sectors of the economy, such
as agriculture, small industry and backward regions and
classes." 76 This led to an unprecedented increase in the
share of priority sector lending, 77 and had some positive
impact on economic development. 78 However, because the
Government of India was creating "artificial distortions in
the market for loanable funds," this led to inefficient
investments, and by 1995, fifty percent of non-performing

75. Panchamukhi, supra note 24, at 75-76.

76. Id. at 78.
77. There were specified targets for advances to priority sectors at a
minimum of forty percent of net outstanding credit. There was also a sub-target
of eighteen percent for agriculture. A. Seshan, Back to Directed Credit, HINDU
BUSINESS LINE, Sept. 14, 2004, available at http://www.thehindubusinessline.
com/2004/09/14/stories/2004091400020800.htm.
78. There was significant increase in the number of banking offices, and
credit extension increased greatly. See Robin Burgess & Rohini Pande, Do
Rural Banks Matter? Evidence from the Indian Social Banking Experiment 4

(Mar. 19, 2003) (unpublished working paper, on file with the Buffalo Law
Review). The number of nationalized bank branches increased from 8,262 in
1969 to 60,220 by 1991. Sumon Bhaumik & Jenifer Piesse, Are Foreign Banks
Bad for Development Even If They Are Efficient? Evidence from the Indian
Banking Industry, at 9 (William Davidson Institute, Working Paper No. 619,
2004), available at http://www.bus.umich.edu/KresgeLibrary/Collections/
Workingpapers/wdilwp6l9.pdf. Banks drew up schemes to extend credit to
priority sectors, and "the amount outstanding under priority-sector lending, by
public sector banks during June 1969 to March 1999 increase from Rs. 441
crore [Rs. 4.41 Billion] to Rs. 1,07,200 crore [Rs. 1,072 Billion] which accounted
for 43.5 percent of their net bank credit." Banking of India in 2000,
http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN002870
.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
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loans were invested in the priority sectors. 79 Thus, the
Indian banking sector, specifically
the PSBs, became
8 0 ,8 1
saddled with huge folios of NPAs.
It is difficult to put an authoritative estimate on the
amount of NPAs in the Indian PSBs.8 2 The major cause of
non-availability of these figures is not just the reluctance of
official sources to come forth with actual numbers, but also
because creative accounting makes it possible for the
managers to conceal the real picture regarding the banks'

79. Miller, supra note 74, at 99. But see Diana Farrell & Susan Lund,
Reforming India's Financial System, MCKINSEY Q., 2005 SPECIAL EDITION:
FULFILLING INDIA'S PROMISE, at 103 ("Of the loans to the priority sectors, 23
percent, far higher that the level elsewhere in the economy, end up as
nonperforming-evidence that the scale of this lending makes little sense.").
The McKinsey data is from around 2002, during which year some of the reforms
that are mentioned elsewhere in this Comment had already started to take
effect.
80. The term non-performing assets is used interchangeably with the term
non-performing loans in this Comment. Non-performing assets are measured on
either gross basis or on net basis (net of provisions). While the number "gross
NPAs" reflects the quality of loans made by the banks, the number "net NPAs"
shows the actual burden of the banks. For a discussion of different, commonlyused NPA ratios, see Paramita Mukherjee, Dealing with NPAs: Lessons from
InternationalExperiences, ICRA BULLETIN: MONEY & FINANCE 64, 67 (Jan.- Mar.
2003). See also Indira Rajaraman et al., NPA Variations Across Indian
Commercial Banks: Some Findings, 1999 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 161, 168 n.3
(describing how gross NPAs can be converted to net NPAs).
81. Figures available from the Reserve Bank of India indicate that PSBs
have higher levels of non-performing loans than their private counterparts. See
ANNUAL ACCOUNTS OF SCHEDULED COMMERCIAL BANKS (Reserve Bank of India
CD-ROM). As noted earlier, this was partly a result of the policy of preferential
lending / directed lending to particular sectors of the economy under specific
guidance from the Reserve Bank of India, so as to further the policy objectives
of the Government of India, and partly due to the "inadequacies in the credit
recovery processes arising from the insufficient legal provisions on foreclosure
and bankruptcy and long drawn out procedures." Akella Suryanarayana &
Anuradha Sivaramakrishnan, The Indian Securitisation Act: Has the Magic
Wand Finally Arrived, ICFAI READER (Sep. 2003), available at
http://www.gtnews.com/article/5210.cfm (last visited Dec. 2, 2005).
82. See, e.g., Narayanan Vaghul, India's Economic Reforms: Positive
Developments, Underlying Concerns and the Big Picture (Center for the
Advanced Study of India, Occasional Paper No. 10, Nov. 1999), available at
http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/vanOl/index.html. This is because official estimates
available from the Reserve Bank of India have been received with skepticism.
See Banerjee et al., supra note 72, at 315.
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actual burden of NPAs.83 This practice, involving the
shifting of bank loans from high-quality borrowers to lowquality borrowers, is called "evergreening, 84 and can make
it appear as if NPAs of a bank are decreasing over a period
of time.8 5 In addition, the classification norms in India for
mapping loan repayment delay to NPAs does not compare
favorably with international norms. 86 However, even
though the estimated value of NPAs in the Indian PSBs
remained highly speculative, there is general consensus
that these have, historically, far exceeded
the global norm
of about five percent of total assets. 87
83. In extreme cases, these creative techniques may be outright illegal. For
instance, in early 1992, soon after Indian economic reforms began in earnest,
certain irregularities were uncovered in the portfolio management activities of a
number of commercial banks. There was an apparent "large-scale breakdown in
the internal controls of banks, as well as systemic violation of Reserve Bank
instructions." Percy S. Mistry, Financial Sector Reform in India: Hesitant
Pursuit of an Incomplete Agenda, in INDIA: THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC REFORM
167, 205 n.7 (Robert Cassen & Vijay Joshi eds., 1995). The extent of new losses
that emerged from this discovery were to the tune of Rs. 40-50 Billion. See id.
84. Evergreening is also called forbearance lending in the economics
literature. See, e.g., Wako Watanabe, Does a Large Loss of Bank Capital Cause
Evergreening?
Evidence
from
Japan,
1
&
n. 1,
Oct.
2005,
http://www.econ.tohoku.ac.jp/-watanabe/evergreening.pdf.
85. How "ever-greening" can be used to create what is tantamount to a
financial smoke screen-an illusion about the true extent of a bank's health-is
readily explained by this example:
Technically, evergreening refers to the practice of 'managing' the
balance sheet through novel ways. For instance, by inflating their
advance portfolio through window-dressing, the banks can bring down
their gross non-performing assets in percentage terms. This is simple
arithmetic. A Rs 5-crore (Rs 50 million) NPA on an advance base of Rs
100 crore (Rs 1 billion) translates into a 5 per cent NPA level. But
when the advance portfolio goes up to Rs 120 crore (Rs 1.20 billion) at
the end of the year, the NPA level automatically drops to 4.16 per
cent-even though no bad assets are recovered.
Tamal Bandyopadhyay, Of Window-dressing and 'Ever-greening,'Apr.15, 2004,
http://us.rediff.com/money/2004/apr/15guest2.htm.
86. See Banerjee et al., supra note 72, at 315. There has since been gradual
change in the classification norms used by the Reserve Bank of India for nonperforming assets. See discussion infra Part III.A.
87. As late as year 2000-2001, some estimates pegged the value of NPAs in
the Indian PSBs at about 64,000 crores [Rs. 640 Billion]. See Non Performing
Assets in Banking Sector, www.indiainfoline.com/bisc/ari/perf.pdf (last visited
Dec. 2, 2005). This translates to gross NPAs of about sixteen percent of total
assets. See Suryanaranyana & Sivaramakrishnan, supra note 81 ("One of the
most thorny issues for the Indian banking sector has been non-performing
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D. The Initial Wave of Banking Reforms
There is a consensus among policy makers that in order
to tackle the problem of NPAs, two broad categories of
policy reforms are usually required. One set of reforms
must target the problem of existing NPAs, and another set
of reforms must ensure that generation of fresh NPAs is
minimized.88 This Comment focuses on progress in India to
find a possible solution to the problem of existing NPAs by
shifting the associated risk to willing investors in capital
markets. Towards achieving this goal, at the very least, an
appropriate legal and institutional environment is
generally required so that there can be quick and efficient
recovery of debts.8 9 Of course, in order to embark upon any
such set of reforms, acknowledging that a problem exists is
essential. As economic reform took a position at the top of
the agenda for the Government of India in the early 1990s,
Indian policymakers realized that banking sector reforms
were necessary and that it was important to get rid of the
NPAs so that banks could compete effectively in an opening
Indian economy.90
The first step toward a solution to the problem of NPAs
was taken when the RBI commissioned the Narasimham
Committee of 1991.91 The Narasimham Committee 1991
Report pointed out that laxity of prudential norms relating
to income recognition, asset classification, and provisioning

assets. According to an estimate, nationalized banks and financial institutions
had sticky assets of Rs. 75,000 crore at the end of the [2002-2003] financial
year. Nationalised banks alone have bad loans that account for 15 percent of
their advances in gross terms and net NPAs at 7-8 percent amounting to nearly
Rs. 60,000 crore."). While the authority of these numbers may also be in doubt,
see, e.g., Recommendations of Tarapore Committee on Capital Account
Convertibility, http://iic.nic.in/iic3j.htm (1997) ("Gross NPAs of the public
sector banking system needs to be brought down from the present 13.7% ...."),
what is not doubtful is that there were large amounts of NPAs on bank balance
sheets, and this number has come down since the various reform measures
taken by the Government of India. See infra note 232.
88. See Mukherjee, supra note 80, at 65.
89. See id. at 65.
90. See generally Mistry, supra note 83; see also Bhaumik & Piesse, supra
note 78, at 10.
91. GovT. OF INDIA, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SYSTEM (1991)
[hereinafter NARASIMHAM COMMITTEE 1991 REPORT].
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had exacerbated the problem of NPAs. 92 Thus the
Narasimham Committee 1991 Report made public what was
already a poorly kept secret in the domestic and
international banking circles: Indian banks had large folios
of NPAs on their balance sheets. The Narasimham
Committee 1991 Report recommended that banks maintain
a risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio of eight percent,
mark their assets to the market, 93 identify the problem
loans on their balance sheets, and make provisions for bad
loans. 94 The Narasimham Committee 1991 Report also
recognized that "stricter asset classification norms and
provisioning practices . . . reduce the scope for delay in
recognizing bad loans." 95 The Committee therefore
recommended instituting a proper definition of NPAs. 96 In
addition, the Narasimham Committee 1991 Report
recommended setting up Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRTs)
to work-out bad loans made by the banks, creating an Asset
Reconstruction Fund to remove these non-performing loans

92. See NARASIMHAM COMMITTEE 1991 REPORT, supra note 91; see also
Mukherjee, supra note 80, at 72. Among other things, Narasimham Committee
1991 also cleared the way for the entry of new banks and deregulated the
expansion of branching networks of existing banks. See Bhaumik & Piesse,
supra note 78, at 10.
93. However, academics have questioned the wisdom of marking assets to
market prices in economies like India. See, e.g., Urjit R. Patel, Emerging
Reforms in Indian Banking: InternationalPerspectives, 42 ECON. & POL. WKLY.
2655, 2657 (1997) ("Since in comparison to more mature economies, asset prices
in emerging economies are more volatile, it is advisable that more conservative
valuation based on underlying values rather than temporarily inflated market
values should be used.").
94. See Bhaumik & Piesse, supra note 78, at 10. See also infra note 99 for a
system of classification of bank advances used by the RBI.
95. Patel, supra note 93, at 2657.
96. See NARASIMHAM COMMITTEE 1991 REPORT, supra note 91; see also infra
note 99, for a discussion of how NPAs are defined and classified today by the
RBI. In response to this recommendation by the Narasimham Committee 1991
Report, a phased alteration of the definition of NPAs in the Indian banking
sector was instituted. Rajaraman, supra note 80, at 161 & 168 n.2 ("A 'nonperforming asset' (NPA) has been defined as a credit facility in respect of which
interest remained unpaid for a period of four quarters ending March 31, 1993,
three quarters ending March 31, 1994 and two quarters ending March 31, 1995
and onwards." (quoting RESERVE BANK OF INDIA,
PROGRESS OF BANKING IN INDIA 1996-97, 121)).
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from bank balance
sheets, and finding ways to recover on
97
these NPAs.
The RBI, on its part, acted swiftly in response to these
recommendations, and notified the PSBs of several
measures to be adopted. 98 For example, new norms for
classification of bank advances were issued. 99 Other
measures, like those aimed at freeing up interest rates on
deposits and advances and reducing cash reserve ratios and
statutory liquidity ratios for banks were also adopted. 100 In
addition, PSBs were allowed to raise equity capital by
accessing the capital markets, thereby reducing their
dependence on the Government of India. 1° 1 These sets of
reforms were completed by the end of Indian fiscal year
97. See NARASIMHAM COMMITTEE 1991 REPORT, supra note 91; see also
Mukherjee, supra note 80, at 72.
98. See Mukherjee, supranote 80, at 72.
99. RBI follows a system of classification of bank advances. Under the
current guidelines issued by the RBI on provisioning requirements with respect
to bank advances, bank advances are mainly classified into:
(1) Standard Assets: Such an asset is not a non-performing asset. In other
words, it carries not more than normal risk attached to the business.
(2) Sub-standard Assets: It is classified as non-performing asset for a period
not exceeding 18 months.
(3) Doubtful Assets: Asset that has remained NPA for a period exceeding 18
months is a doubtful asset.
(4) Loss Assets: Here loss is identified by the banks concerned or by internal
auditors or by external auditors or by Reserve Bank India (RBI) inspection.
In terms of RBI guidelines, as and when an asset becomes an NPA, such
advances would be first classified as a Sub-standard Asset for a period that
should not exceed eighteen months, and subsequently, as a Doubtful Asset. See
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, REPORT ON TREND AND PROGRESS OF BANKING IN INDIA

2003-04, 33.
100. Mukherjee, supra note 80, at 72. Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) and
Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) are two key indicators of the health of the
banking sector. Among the steps taken by the Reserve Bank of India were
introducing of a Capital Adequacy Norm of 8 percent and institutionalizing the
identification of NPAs. In addition, a scheme for gradual reduction of CRR and
SLR was adopted. This resulted in a positive impact on the banking sector over
a period from 1991 to 1998 so that CRR came down to 11 percent from 15
percent and SLR came down to 25 percent from 38.5 percent. Mukherjee, supra
note 80, at 72 n.12.
101. Mukherjee, supra note 80, at 72 n.12. This measure, along with the
recommendation of setting up the ARCs by the Narasimham Committee 1998
Report, see infra note 109 and accompanying text, formed the foundation for the
legislation enabling securitization of non-performing loans.
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1998 and made the Indian banking sector ready for another
round of reforms. 10 2 Thus, the Government of India and RBI
set up the second Narasimham Committee in 1998.103 The
terms of reference for second Narasimham Committee were
generally about giving recommendations about building a
strong foundation for the banking system as well as about
more mundane issues like that of technological upgrades.104
This was an interesting time for India's policy makers.
The Asian financial crisis had left the economies of South
Asia devastated and the future of financial reform in
developing countries unclear. 105 In addition, the Tarapore
Committee set up by the Reserve Bank of India to
"lay a road map" to capital account convertibility had
submitted its recommendations. 106 In its recommendations,
one of the key assertions by the Tarapore Committee was
that the Indian banking sector should be strengthened
before making the Indian rupee fully convertible. 0 7 Thus,
with this backdrop, the second Narasimham Committee
started drawing up its recommendations targeting the
capital adequacy and asset classification norms. 108

102. See Bhaumik & Piesse, supra note 78, at 10. The fiscal year in India
begins on April 1, and ends on March 31. Id. at 10 n.11.
103. GoVT. OF INDIA, REPORT OF THE COMMITFEE ON FINANCIAL SYSTEM (1998)
[hereinafter NARAS]MHAM COMMITTEE 1998 REPORT].
104. See Bhaumik & Piesse, supra note 78, at 11.
105. See, e.g., DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING
HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY (Free Press 2002) (1998);
Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy (PBS television
broadcast 2002).
106. See Recommendations of Tarapore Committee on Capital Account
Convertibility, available at http://iic.nic.in/iic3j.htm (1997).
107. See id.; see also Bhaumik & Piesse, supra note 78, at 11.
108. See NARASImHAM COMMITTEE 1998 REPORT, supra note 103; see also
Mukherjee, supra note 80, at 72-73. Some of the key recommendations of the
NarasimhamCommittee 1998 Report targeting capital adequacy norms were:
[M] easures of capital adequacy should take into account market risk of
the banks' assets (including the exchange rate risk of foreign currency
held by the banks) and undertake risk management by utilizing "value
at risk" models. In addition, the Narasimham Committee also
recommended that entire portfolio of government securities with the
banks be marked to market within a 3-year period.
Bhaumik & Piesse, supra note 78, at 12 & n.15.
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In its recommendations, the second Narasimham
Committee made an attempt at resolving the problem of the
existing NPAs by way of asset securitization. The
Narasimham Committee 1998 Report proposed establishing
an Asset Reconstruction Company (ARC).109 The ARC
would determine a realizable value of NPAs and issue "NPA
Swap Bonds," 110 or banks could issue government
guaranteed bonds which would form their Tier II capital."'
In addition, the Narasimham Committee 1998 Report
proposed new standards
for asset classification 1 2 and for
3
income recognition."
Although the Narasimham Committee 1998 Report also
expressed concern over the financial health of certain

The Narasimham Committee 1998 Report also recommended several proposals
on classification assets so as to better reflect their value to the banks' portfolios.
For example, the NarasimhamCommittee 1998 Report proposed that:
[T]he average level of net NPAs as a fraction of credit outstanding for
all banks be reduced to 5 percent or less by [year] 2000 and to 3 percent
by 2002. For banks with an international presence, the corresponding
targets for gross and net NPAs . . . be 5 percent and 3 percent, and 3

percent and [zero] percent respectively.
Bhaumik & Piesse, supra note 78, at 12 n.14.
109. See NARASIMHAM COMMITTEE 1998 REPORT, supra note 103; see also
Mukherjee, supranote 80, at 72-73.
110. Mukherjee, supra note 80, at 73.
111. Id.; see also Bhaumik & Piesse, supra note 78, at 12 ("[G]overnment
might have to guarantee the bonds issued by the ARCs, the proceeds from
which could then be used to buy the bad assets of the banks at a discount.").
Government guarantees are important for such bond issues. This is because
such instruments can then be eligible for investments by banks or insurance
companies for the purposes of maintaining recommended statutory liquidity
ratios. See Mukherjee, supra note 80, at 73.
112. As explained, RBI classifies advances by banks in different subcategories. See RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, supra note 99. The Narasimham
Committee 1998 Report recommended that if an asset was categorized as "substandard" for an 18 month period, it should be converted to the "doubtful"
category. Further, this time period should gradually be reduced to 12 months.
See NARASIMHAM COMMITTEE 1998 REPORT, supra note 103; see also Mukherjee,
supra note 80, at 73.
113. The Narasimham Committee 1998 Report proposed that relevant time
period for income recognition be changed from 180 days to 90 days thereby
bringing it in sync with international standards. Mukherjee, supra note 80, at
73.
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banks, 114 and recommended criteria for identifying other
weak banks, 115 it stopped short of proposing any radical
steps such as closure of these weaker banks.116
Furthermore, by recommending that the Government of
India reduce its equity in the PSBs to no more than thirtythree percent, and not recapitalize weak banks, it
effectively provided no advice regarding such PSBs. 117
Therefore the mantle of preparing a policy recommendation
in this regard fell upon the Verma Committee of 1999.118
The terms of reference of the Verma Committee dictated
that it "develop[] . . . guidelines for treating weak public
sector banks." 119 Among other recommendations, 20 the
114. See Bhaumik & Piesse, supra note 78, at 13. Some of the PSBs like
United Bank of India, United Commercial Bank, and Indian Bank "were clearly
underperforming even by the modest standards of the public sector banks." Id.
115. See Mukherjee, supra note 80, at 73. These criteria were: "(a)
accumulated losses and net NPAs exceed[ing] the net worth of the bank, and (b)
operating losses less the income on recapitalization bonds.., negative for three
consecutive years." Id.
116. Bhaumik & Piesse, supra note 78, at 13.
117. See Mukherjee, supranote 80, at 73.
118. RESERVE BANK
RESTRUCTURING
WEAK

OF INDIA, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
PUBLIC
SECTOR
BANKS
(1999),
available at

http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationReportDetails.aspx?UrlPage=&ID=46
[hereinafter VERMA COMMITTEE REPORT].

119. See Bhaumik & Piesse, supra note 78, at 11.
120. The Verma Committee Report made some recommendations, which,
given the delicate political-economic structure of India, can only be termed
radical. See Bhaumik & Piesse, supra note 78, at 13-14. For example,
The Verma Committee concluded that the public sector banks were
under pressure because of the prudential norms regarding asset
classification and provisioning for NPAs, and because of the
intensification of competition subsequent to the first phase of banking
sector reforms. However, the committee pointed out that the dismal
performance of the weak public sector banks was not merely on account
of exogenous shocks, but rather that internal problems like limited
number of products, poor risk management systems and mediocre
service had also contributed. It concluded that mergers and narrow
banking are unlikely to resolve the problem of weak banks. Further,
while the committee viewed privatization as perhaps the best course of
action, it recognized that the cost of restructuring weak state owned
banks to make them attractive to private investors would be
prohibitively high.
The committee identified persistence of the large volume of NPAs as
the biggest challenge facing the weak public sector banks, and
proposed, as did the second Narasimham Committee, that ARCs be
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Verma Committee Report laid out the details of how to
structure and operate the ARCs.121
However, while all these steps were well-intended, the
results were a far cry from success. Lack of monitoring
efforts on part of PSBs-partly because of collusive
activities of the officers and partly because of lack of
institutional norms and lack of adopted international best
practices-as well as ineffective bankruptcy laws resulted
in constraining the recovery process. 122 In addition, lack of
well-functioning legal procedures and undue delay in the
adjudication process led to a failure of the intended
recovery process. 23
Besides these structural problems, there were
institutional difficulties. For example, in 1993, in response
to the recommendations of the Narasimham Committee
1991 Report, DRTs were set up to speed the recovery
proceeding initiated by banks. 124 However, the performance
of DRTs was highly unsatisfactory because of various
impediments. 125 One such impediment was the Sick
Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act (SICA).126
Banks found it extremely difficult to sue for recovery of
money against an industrial entity registered as "sick"
used as the vehicle for alleviating this problem. Importantly, the
committee categorically stated that the weak banks would have to
lower costs by reducing the number of staff ....

It proposed that the

staff strength of weak public sector banks be reduced by 25 percent.
Moreover, it argued that if VRS [voluntary retirement scheme] fails to
reduce the operating cost of these banks, there should be across-theboard wage cuts for their employees.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
121. See Mukherjee, supra note 80, at 72, 74.
122. Id. at 75; see also Suryanarayana & Sivaramakrishnan, supra note 81
("[I]nadequacies in the credit recovery processes arising from the insufficient
legal provisions on foreclosure and bankruptcy and long drawn legal procedures
... placed the lenders at a disadvantage compared to the borrowers.").
123. See Mukherjee, supra note 80, at 75.
124. Id. at 74.
125. Until September 2001, in all the cases pending before DRTs, a mere 3.8
percent of NPAs could be recovered. See G.P. Muniappan, Deputy Governer,
Reserve Bank of India, Address at the CII Banking Summit 2002: The NPA
Overhang-Magnitude, Solutions, Legal Reforms 8-9 (Apr. 1, 2002) (transcript
available at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.i/sec5/27663.pdf).
126. The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, No. 1 of 1986,
availableat http://indiacode.nic.in.
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under SICA.127 This was because of-among other
reasons-the consent required from the Board for
Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR), created
129
under article 4 of SICA, 128 for the process of recovery.
These vestiges of the "license raj"'130 era of socialist
India were an anachronism in the fast-changing world of
the liberalized Indian economy and were being used by
defaulting companies to their advantage. 131 Fortunately,
the Government of India realized that drastic steps were
required to expedite the recovery of NPAs, and therefore a
bill abolishing SICA, the Sick Industrial Companies
(Special Provisions) Repeal Bill was introduced in the Lok
Sabha 132 on August 30, 2001.1 33 In addition, another bill the
Companies (Amendment) Bill of 2001 was also introduced
127. Mukherjee, supra note 80, at 74 & n.15; see also Omkar Goswami,
Myth of ARCs, ICFAI READER, Sept. 1999, at 54.
128. The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act art. 4, No. 1 of
1986, available at http://indiacode.nic.in; see also "Banks Need to be More
Proactive in Debt Recovery" CHARTERED FIN. ANALYST, Nov. 1999, at 58; How to
Revitalize the Debt Recovery Mechanism, CHARTERED FIN. ANALYST, Oct. 1999, at
25
129. Mukherjee, supra note 78, at 72 & n.15. The SICA had an elaborate
scheme to "timely detect[ .
. .. sick and potentially sick companies owning
industrial undertakings," and for "speedy determination ... of the preventive,
ameliorative, remedial and other measures which need[ed] to be taken with
respect to such companies .

.

.

."

The Sick Industrial Companies (Special

Provisions) Act Pmbl., No. 1 of 1986, availableat http://indiacode.nic.in.
130. For much of the latter half of the twentieth century, India followed a
policy of import substitution. This also meant that any person intending to
invest in an industry needed to go through bureaucratic machinations of
obtaining a "license" for it. Because of the rampant corruption in awarding
these licenses, the era came to be known as "license raj," or the reign of those
with power to grant or receive a license.
131. As could be expected in a bureaucracy, the process of referral to the
BIFR, and subsequent recovery process, became mired in endless bureaucratic
hurdles, and thus the recovery process languished. See, e.g., Good News India,
Time Running
Out for
Old World
Tycoons
(Nov. 28,
2002),
http://www.goodnewsindia.com/index.php/Supplement/article/312/
(last visited
Mar. 27, 2007).
132. Lok Sabha is the lower house in the bicameral Indian Parliament.
133. PARLIAMENT OF INDIA, RAJYA SABHA, RELATED PARLIAMENTARY
STANDING COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY: NINETY-THIRD REPORT ON ACTION TAKEN BY
THE GOVERNMENT ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN THE 75TH REPORT OF
THE DEPARTMENT-RELATED PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY

ON DEMANDS FOR GRANTS
12.5 (Dec. 19, 2002),
http://rajyasabha.nic.in/book2/reports/indus/93rdreport.htm.

available at
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in the Lok Sabha to bring about changes necessary to
expedite the recovery of bad loans. 134 Although the bills
were presented amid much fanfare, 135 only the Companies
(Amendment) Act 136 was passed in 2001; the other
languished in the parliamentary system until 2003 when
the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Repeal
Act finally became law.137
Amidst all this, performance of PSBs continued to be
adversely affected, partly as a result of the delicate political
economic structure of India, partly because of competition
from foreign banks, and partly because of inherent
structural deficiencies. 138 This built up a sense of urgency in
the Indian bureaucratic and political circles. All the frenetic
activity and public debate over NPAs resulted in a rather
drastic step, the promulgation of "The Securitisation,
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of
Security Interest Ordinance, 2002" (SARFAESI), 139 by the
134. See Yashwant Sinha, Minister of Finance, Speech on Union Budget
2002-2003,
7 (Feb. 28, 2002), available at http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub200203/bs/speech a.htm.
135. See MINISTRY OF FINANCE, ECONOMIC SURVEY 2001-2002, Chap. 7.1,
available at http://indiabudget.nic.in/es2001-02/indus.htm; TENTH FIVE YEAR
PLAN 2002-07, PLANNING COMMISSION OF INDIA, Chap. 7.1, available at
http://planningcommission.nic.inplans/planrel/fiveyr/lOth/volume2/v2_ch7_l.pdf
("In order to solve the problems experienced and to reduce the time taken in the
winding up/liquidation of companied under the Companies Act 1956 . . . a Bill
namely the Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2001 has been introduced in the Lok
Sabha on August 30, 2001. [In addition, t]he Abolition of Sick Industrial
Companies Act (SICA) bill was introduced in Lok Sabha on August 30, 2001....
As these Bills get enacted the process of industrial restructuring should become
easier and faster.").
136. The Companies (Amendment) Act, No. 57 of 2001, available at
http://indiacode.nic.in.
137. The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Repeal Act, No. 1 of
2004, available at http://indiacode.nic.in.
138. These deficiencies included, for example, problems in customer service,
outdated information and telecommunication technology, and over-staffing, and
were pointed out by the Narasimham Committee 1998. See Mukherjee, supra
note 80, at 73. Over the years, the Government of India commissioned several
committees that reported their findings on reform of the financial sector and
pointed out some of these problem areas. See T. N. SRINIVASAN, EIGHT LECTURES
ON INDIA'S ECONOMIC REFORMS, 61, 66-70 (2000).

139. The
Enforcement
Justice, and
promulgated

Securitisation, Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
of Security Interest Ordinance, Ord. 2 of 2002 (Ministry of Law,
Co. Affairs, Legislative Dep't). The Government of India
another ordinance, see infra note 140 (discussing what is an
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Government of India.140 Suddenly, there was an
enhancement of creditors' rights, which empowered "banks
and financial institutions to take possession of the
securities 141 and sell them42 without going through the
protracted judicial process."'
With this background in place, I proceed to analyze the
legal developments related to resolving the existing NPAs
problem in India by transferring the risks associated with
ordinance), on the expiration of SARFAESI, called the Securitization and
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest
(Second) Ordinance, 2002 (Ord. 3 of 2002), identical in all respects to the
original SARFAESI. In order to facilitate the reader's comprehension of the big
picture, I use SARFAESI for both the first and the second ordinance, as well as
for the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement
of Security Interest Act, No. 54 of 2002, see infra note 143, which is the Act of
Parliament adopted to enforce the scheme of SARFAESI ordinances.
140. An ordinance is a legislative device in India used to bypass the usual
machinations associated with the parliamentary system. In a democracy like
India-where there is always a possiblity that a bill will die in the
parliamentary quagmire that a multi-party system can generate-this can be a
very handy tool, at least for the short term. I hope this cynical view does not
take the reader's eyes away from the genius of this device. Article 123 of the
Indian Constitution deals with the legislative powers of the President of India.
INDIA CONST. art. 123 [hereinafter the Constitution]. In order for the President
to promulgate an ordinance under article 123, four conditions must be met.
These are:
i.
both Houses of Parliament must not be in session,
ii.

circumstances must exist which render it necessary for the
President to take immediate action,

iii. he must be satisfied that the circumstances require him to act
in that manner, and
iv.
the provisions contained in the Ordinance must be within the
legislative competence of Parliament to enact and must not
violate any of the fundamental rights or prohibitions
contained in the Constitution.
GAE, supra note 43, at 4. An ordinance promulgated under article 123 has the
same force and effect as an Act of Parliament, but only for a limited period of
time. Therefore an ordinance "ceases to operate at the expiration of six weeks
from the re-assembly of Parliament. Id. at 6. Unless the ordinance is withdrawn
by the President or is disapproved by resolutions passed by both Houses of
Parliament, the Ordinance is binding on both Houses of Parliament. Id.
Passage of an ordinance usually acts symbolically to indicate the desperate
nature of the situation which an ordinance covers. Compare supra note 71, and
accompanying text, with conditions that led to the passage of the SARFAESI.
141. The term "securities" is used here in the sense of collateral.
142. Mukherjee, supra note 80, at 75.
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these NPAs to willing investors in capital markets. In other
words, I analyze key issues-some addressed, others
perhaps neglected-in SARFAESI, which has since been
adopted as an act of Parliament. 143 However, before delving
into this discussion, I venture to explain securitization, first
generally, and then using NPAs as an asset class.
II. ASSET SECURITIZATION
Part A provides a basic review of the asset
securitization technique and describes a typical asset
securitization deal. Part B discusses securitization of NPAs
and critical issues in such transactions.

143. The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
Enforcement of Security Interest Act, No. 54 of 2002, available at
http://indiacode.nic.in.
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A. Basics of Asset Securitization
Defining securitization is a formidable task. 144 It means
different things for different people. 145 As one commentator
puts it, the concept of securitization is like the elephant in
the fable of three blind men who attempt to describe it.146
However, in its most fundamental form, securitization is
"[reducible to] a search for liquidity,"147 and can be viewed
as a form of disintermediation so that a borrower may
access the financial markets directly without the
intermediation of commercial banks. 148 Among these pithy
generalizations, a rather standard definition from early
days of securitization emerges. Accordingly, Securitization
is:
[T]he sale of equity or debt instruments, representing ownership
interests in, or secured by, a segregated, income-producing asset or
pool of assets, in a transaction structured to reduce or reallocate
certain risks inherent in owning or lending against the underlying
assets and to ensure that such interests are more readily
marketable and, thus, more liquid than
ownership interests in and
149
loans against the underlying assets.

144. See Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization:
Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers,69 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1373 (1991)

("There is no particular legal meaning for securitization ... .
145. Id. at 1373 n.16.
146. See James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Comment, in STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN
BANKING,

338, 338 (Michael Klausner & Lawrence J. White eds., 1993)

(discussing

TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL
ASSETS POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES BY TAMAR FRANKEL (1991) and

noting: "[S]ecuritization as a concept is very much like the elephant in the fable:
Securitization can mean quite different things to different people.").
147. HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
REGULATION 260 (2002).
148. See Lakshman Alles, Asset Securitization and Structured Financing:
Future Prospectsand Challengesfor Emerging Market Countries(Int'l Monetary

Fund, Working Paper WP/01/147, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/
externalpubs/ft/wp/2001/wpO l147.pdf.
149. Shenker & Colletta, supra note 144, at 1374-75. Compare this
definition with the one available in Asset-Backed Securities, 70 Fed. Reg. 1506,
1508 (Jan. 7, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 210, 228-229, 232, 239, 240,
242, 245, and 249) [hereinafter Regulation AB] ("Asset-backed securities are
securities that are backed by a discrete pool of self-liquidating financial assets.
Asset-backed securitization is a financing technique in which financial assets,
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Securitization of assets as a financing tool has come a
long way since the 1970s when the first securities backed
by residential mortgages were introduced in the United
States debt markets. 150 Although technically, securitization
existed in some form before the modern securitized

in many cases themselves less liquid, are pooled and converted into instruments
that may be offered and sold in the capital markets. In a basic securitization
structure, an entity, often a financial institution and commonly known as a
'sponsor,' originates or otherwise acquires a pool of financial assets, such as
mortgage loans, either directly or through an affiliate. It then sells the financial
assets, again either directly or through an affiliate, to a specially created
investment vehicle that issues securities 'backed' or supported by those
financial assets, which securities are 'asset-backed securities.' Payment on the
asset-backed securities depends primarily on the cash flows generated by the
assets in the underlying pool and other rights designed to assure timely
payment, such as liquidity facilities, guarantees or other features generally
known as credit enhancements. The structure of asset-backed securities is
intended, among other things, to insulate ABS investors from the corporate
credit risk of the sponsor that originated or acquired the financial assets."), and
with the one used in SARFAESI, see infra notes 185-191 and accompanying
text.
150. Capital markets differentiate between securitized products that are
backed by mortgages (mortgage-backed securities, or 'MBS") and those that are
backed by other kinds of assets (asset-backed securities, or "ABS"). The first
securitized products in the United States were "agency" MBS, see Andrew
Carron et. al, CREDIT RATINGS FOR STRUCTURED PRODUCTS: A REVIEW OF
ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGIES, CREDIT ASSESSMENT ACCURACY, AND ISSUER
SELECTIVITY AMONG THE CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 9-10 (National Economic
Research Associates, 2003) [hereinafter CREDIT RATINGS REVIEW], issued by the

federal agencies created under the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
Act, Title III of the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. No. 91-531,
303(a) Stat. 450, 452 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 1452(a) (2000)). These
agencies, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or "Freddie
Mac"), Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA, or "Fannie Mae"), and
the Government National Mortgage Corporation, (GNMA or "Ginnie Mae"),
collectively called the Government Sponsored Entities or GSEs, see Claire A.
Hill, Securitization:A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061,
1106-07, 1113 n.213 (1996), bought qualifying home mortgages from lenders,
pooled these mortgages, and issued securities backed by these pools in the
capital markets. See CHRISTINE A. PAVEL, SECURITIZATION: THE ANALYSIS AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LOAN-BASED/ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES MARKET 6 (1989);
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ ET AL., SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CAPITAL
MARKETS 2 (2004). Later, this model of pooling together assets to issue
marketable securities was replicated by "non-agency" or "private-label" issuers.
CREDIT RATINGS REVIEW, supra, at 10. Currently, the MBS market is one of the
largest among the various asset classes that are being securitized. See infra
note 153; Mark Adelson & David Jacob, Thirty Years Later Securitization Is
Still Good for America, (Nomura Sec. Int'l, Inc. (Mar. 15, 2002, New York,
N.Y.)), available at http://www.vinodkothari.com/Nomura%20%20Securitization
%201s%2OStill%2OGood%20for%20America.pdf.
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products, 151 it is principally an American financing
technique. 6 2 In its early years, securitization was almost
always used to finance relatively simple, standardized, and
self-liquidating assets such as mortgage loans; 53 today
securitization has expanded in both its applications and in
its global outreach. Securitization of a variety of cash flows
is now frequently employed in more complicated financing
structures around the world. 154 Securitization, amidst all
151. Technically, securitization existed in some form before the modern
securitization instruments. See, e.g., Meir Kohn, The Capital Market Before

1600, in THE ORIGINS OF WESTERN ECONOMIC SUCCESS: COMMERCE, FINANCE, AND
GOVERNMENT
IN
PRE-INDUSTRIAL
EUROPE,
available
at
http://www.dartmouth.edu/-mkohn/Papers/99-06.pdf;
1062 n.2.

Hill, supra note 150, at

152. Johnny P. Chen, Non-Performing Loan Securitization in the People's
Republic of China 1 (May, 2004) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Stanford
University), available at http://www-econ.stanford.edu/academics/HonorsTheses/Theses_2004/Chen.pdf.
153. The early securitization model has been replicated by both quasigovernmental agencies as well as the private sector to securitize different kinds
of cash flows. Hence, securities backed by pools of student loans (first originated
by the Student Loan Marketing Association (SLMA or "Sallie Mae"), see TAMAR
FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSETS POOLS,
AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES BY TAMAR FRANKEL 37 (1991)), farm loans,

automobile loans, commercial leases, credit card receivables, and trade
receivables, among other kinds, have been issued. Of course, with appropriate
guarantees and credit enhancements in place, see infra note 170 and
accompanying text, virtually any asset class with any risk profile can be
securitized. Currently, the MBS market is one of the largest among the various
asset classes that are being securitized. See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 148,
at 261 (noting that in the United States, by the mid-1990s, there were over $1
trillion in outstanding issues of MBS.). In the year 2003 alone, Residential MBS
accounted for over $215 billion in new issuance, STRUCTURED DEBT YEARBOOK
2004: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ABS, MBS AND CDO MARKETS 77 (Banc One Capital
Mkts., Inc., 2004), while securities backed by vehicles accounted for about $78
billion in new issues. Id.
154. Complexity of securitized (or "structured") products is limited only by
the need, or imagination, if you will, of players in the market. Securitization of
virtually any kind of cash flow is theoretically-and, it seems, practicallypossible. See supra note 153. Among the more exotic asset classes that are being
securitized include music copyright royalties, see Teresa N. Kerr, Bowie

Bonding in the Music Biz: Will Music Royalty Securitization Be the Key to the
Gold for Music Industry Participants?,7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 367 (2000), tax

arrears, see Alberto M. Ramos, Government Expenditure Arrears:Securitization
and Other Solutions (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/98/70, 1998),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9870.pdf, drug royalties,

see Malcolm S. Dorris, The Securitization of Drug Royalties: A New Elixir?
GLOBAL SECURITISATION & STRUCTURED FINANCE (Dechert LLP 2003), available
at

http://www.dechert.com/library/Seciritization%20of%2ODrug%2ORoyalties
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this frenetic activity surrounding it, however, still remains
largely an innovation.155
Despite the complexity of present day securitization
structures, a typical securitization deal 56 involves a firm
(Originator) identifying and selling its rights to receive
Dorris-2003.pdf, tobacco settlements, see E. Matthew Quigley, Securitizing
Tobacco Settlements: The Basics, the Benefits, the Risks, NEW ENG. FISCAL FACTS
No. 30 (Fed. Res. Bank of Boston), Winter 2002-2003, at 1, available at
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/neff/neff30/tobacco.pdf, stranded costs of utility
companies, see Charles N. Schorin & Kevin Roach, Utility Stranded Costs
Securitization,in HANDBOOK OF STRUCTURED FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 263 (Frank J.
Fabozzi ed., 1998), risk in project lending, see J. Paul Forrester, Project Finance
CDOs: What? Why? Now?, Mayer
Brown & Platt, Mar. 2001,
http://www.securitization.net/knowledge/transactions/projcdowww.asp (last visited
Feb. 14, 2007), cash flow from limited partnership interests in private equity
funds, see Jeffrey D'Souza, Private Equity: Securitisation and Related
Transactions-A Two-Part Primer, http://www.globalsecuritisation.com
06_intro/013-021.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2007); Standard & Poor's, CDO
Spotlight: Global Criteriafor Private Equity Securitization, Jan. 18, 2006 (on
file with the Buffalo Law Review), funds of hedge funds, see Standard & Poor's,
CDO Spotlight: Global Criteriafor Securitizations of Funds of Hedge Funds,
Jan.
18,
2006,
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/
011806_cdo hedge_fundSNAP.pdf, and even "securitiztions [sic] of discharged
chapter 7 debt," see STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL TO
SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CAPITAL MARKETS 6 (2004).
155. Although securitization, as we know it, is almost three decades old, the
frontier is rapidly changing. To put things in perspective, the Securities and
Exchange Commission came out with a comprehensive set of regulations aimed
at "address[ing] comprehensively the registration, disclosure and reporting
requirements for asset-backed securities" only recently. See Regulation AB, 70
Fed. Reg. 1506, 1508 (Jan. 7, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 210, 228-229,
232, 239, 240, 242, 245, and 249). Further, in countries like India, it is only in
the past few years that the use of securitized products has gained momentum.
See ICRA RATING FEATURE, UPDATE ON THE INDIAN STRUCTURED FINANCE
MARKET (July 2005), http://www.icraratings.com/rating-article/2005-JulyFRmarketupdateFY05.pdf; see also Chakravarthi Anand, Securitization
Markets: Indian and Global Scenario, GT NEWS, June 21, 2004 (originally
published in ICFAI Reader), http://www.gtnews.com/article/5535.cfm (last
visited Fed. 14, 2007) ("[Securitization] is still in its nascent stages, with
securitized assets as low as about 2% of all debt outstanding.").
156. For a detailed discussion of the process of securitization, see FRANKEL,
supra note 153; A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION (L.T. Kendall & M.J. Fishman
eds., 1996); George S. Oldfield, The Economics of Structured Finance,J. FIXED
INCOME, Sept. 1997, at 92; Brian D. Rance, Securitization: Back to Basics,
BRIEFLY, Aug. 2005, at 1; Shenker & Colletta, supra note 144, at 1376-80;
Robert B. Titus, Asset Securitization:Marvel of the Marketplace, But Should We
Be Uneasy?, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 271 (1993) (book review). For an extensive list of
sources that discuss securitization generally, see Claire A. Hill, supra note 150,
at 1062 n.1.
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certain future monies (Receivables) to a special purpose
entity. 157 By isolating these assets from the selling entity
158
and transferring the assets to a special purpose vehicle,
the Originator can obtain present cash flow. 159 This special
purpose vehicle then issues marketable securities, usually
bonds, which are most certainly rated higher than the debt
of the entity selling the assets to the special purpose
vehicle. 160 Depending upon the performance characteristics

157. Kerr, supra note 154, at 370; see also Peter J. Lahni IV, Asset
Securitization: A Discussion of the Traditional Bankruptcy Attacks and an
Analysis of the Next Potential Attack, Substantive Consolidation, 9 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 815, 816-17 (2001).

158. An originator or sponsor may create a legal entity, an SPV (sometimes
referred to as a special purpose entity (SPE)), by transferring assets to the SPV
to carry out some specific purpose, circumscribed activity, or a series of such
transactions. See Gary Gorton & Nicholas S. Souleles, Special Purpose Vehicles
and Securitization 1, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
11190, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wlll90. SPVs have no
purpose other than the transaction(s) for which they were created, and they can
make no substantive decisions; articles of incorporation of such entities
circumscribe their activities. Id. The SPV sponsoring firm maintains control
over the business decisions while the financing is done in SPVs that are
passive; they cannot make business decisions. Id. Furthermore, the SPVs are
not subject to bankruptcy costs because they cannot go bankrupt, as a matter of
design. Id.
159. Kerr, supranote 154, at 370.
160. Securitization transactions where assets are removed from an
originator's balance sheet are called "true sale" securitizations. Such
transactions, for obvious reasons, are also called off-balance sheet transactions.
However, there are "synthetic" securitizations also which combine features from
true sale securitizations as well as those of credit derivatives. Thus by using
credit derivatives like credit default swaps (CDS), credit-linked notes (CLN),
and total rate of return swap (also called total return swap or TRS), commercial
effects of true sale securitization can be achieved. For a general discussion of
credit derivatives, see J.P. MORGAN, THE J.P. MORGAN GUIDE TO CREDIT
DERIVATIVES, http://www.investinginbonds.com/assets/files/Intro toCreditDeriv

atives.pdf (discussing various credit derivative instruments listed above as well
as a specific discussion of BISTRO (Broad Index Secured Trust Offering), the
synthetic securitization structure developed by J.P. Morgan that is used to
transfer tranched credit exposure to large, diversified portfolios of commercial
or consumer loans from the originator to the investors); LEHMAN BROS., THE
LEHMAN

BROTHERS

GUIDE

TO

EXOTIC

CREDIT

DERIVATIVES,

http://www.investinginbonds.com/assets/files/LehmanExoticCredDerivs.pdf.
Such synthetic securitizations work for changing the originator's credit risk
position, and do not necessarily involve removing the assets off of the balance
sheet of the originator. This is because these instruments can be structured
either as an off-balance sheet derivative, or as an on-balance sheet note. See
Tom Boemio, Synthetic Securitizations: Risk-Based Capital and Regulatory
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of the underlying assets, various credit enhancements may
be used so as to assure the investors of the returns
associated with these securities. 16 1 One key issue in these
transactions is to ensure that the transfer of assets results
in isolation of the assets from the seller and that these
assets do not62 recourse back to the seller in the event of
bankruptcy.1
Reporting Treatments (Sep. 29, 2005) (unpublished PowerPoint presentation,
available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/Statistics/News/ConfO5/3_Synthetic
SecuBoemioLBC2005.ppt). Thus, commercial credit protection, capital relief,
and exposure to an asset without having the obligation to retain ownership of
the asset can be achieved by the involved parties. For a detailed discussion of
synthetic securitization, see J. Paul Forrester, Synthetic Resecuritizations: A
Step Too Far?,Dec. 2003 (originally published in INT'L FIN. L. REV., Dec. 2003);
Elizabeth Uwaifo & Mark I. Greenberg, Key Issues In StructuringA Synthetic
Securitisation Transaction, EUROPE SECURITISATION & STRUCTURED FIN. GUIDE
139 (2001) http://www.sidley.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/Key%20Issues%20in%20
Structuring%20(Uwaifo).pdf; see also Antulio N. Bomfim, UnderstandingCredit
Derivatives and their Potential to Synthesize Riskless Assets, July 11, 2001,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2001/ 200150/200150pap.pdf; Francis
A. Longstaff et al., The Credit-Default Swap Market: Is Credit ProtectionPriced
Correctly? 3-5, Aug. 2003, http://www.ma.utexas.edu/Seminars/MathFin/
R.G.
Nolan,
Synthetic
FaUl2003/LongstaffMithalNeis.pdf;
Anthony
Securitizations And Derivatives Under Federal Reserve Regulation W, Feb. 1,
2005, http://www.goodwinprocter.com/getfile.aspx?filepath=/Files/publications/
nolan-synthsecfedregw_2_05.pdf; Letter from Myongsu Kong, Senior Vice
President and Associate General Counsel, Citigroup Global Markets Inc., to
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission 2 (July 16,
2004), http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72104/cgmi07l604.pdf.
161. In an ABS transaction, it is necessary for the issuer to satisfy the
purchasers of the credit quality of the securities. Credit enhancements are
provided by the sellers for this particular purpose. Credit enhancements may be
internal, given by the originator, such as subordination of interest, overcollateralization, excess spread, reserve account, and collateral interest; or may
be external, such as a letter of credit, agreement to purchase defaulting
receivables, financial guarantees (sometimes called liquidity facilities) and
surety bonds. See J. David Cummins, Securitization of Life Insurance Assets
and Liabilities 6, Jan. 3, 2004, http://www.huebnergeneva.org/documents/
cumminssecuritization.pdf. See generally Oldfield, supra note 156; Jennifer 0.
Quisenberry, Securitization of Non-Traditional Asset Types: An Investor's
Perspective, in HANDBOOK OF STRUCTURED FINANCIAL PRODUCTS, supra note 154,
at 21; Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L.
Bus. & FIN. 133 (1994); Warren Lee, Future Applications of Securitization in
Asia (Nov. 13, 2003) (unpublished PowerPoint presentation, available at
http://law.hku.hk/aiifl/ABMF/Lee%20Securitisation.pdf).
162. Courts, at least in United States, focus "on the presence of recourse for
credit losses as the primary factor in determining whether there has been a
'true sale."' Stuart M. Litwin & William A. Levy, New Developments in
Equipment and Auto Lease Financing: Securitization, Leveraged Leasing and
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B. Securitizing NPAs
The nature of the banking industry has changed rapidly
over the past few decades, and asset-backed securitization
has contributed significantly to this change. 163 Over the
years, asset-backed securitization has become an "integral
part of ... modern banking activities,"' 164 so much so that
formal models are being developed to understand the effects
of asset-backed securitization on the capital structure of
banks. 165
An increase in default rates of repayment of loans by
debtors is the primary motivation for Originators to
securitize their portfolios of non-performing loans. 66 Such
increased default rates negatively affect a bank's financial
performance. 67 Securitization permits the originating
financial institution to transfer the credit risks associated
with its NPAs portfolio to willing investors in capital
1 68
markets, thereby positively influencing its balance sheet.
(2000), available at http://www.securitization.net
Titling Trusts 6
pdfflitwinjlevy2.pdf. If the transfer of financial assets is with recourse, it is
usually not considered a true sale "unless the amount of the recourse is de
minimis." Id.
163. Simon Wolfe, Structural Effects of Asset-Backed Securitization, 6 EUR.
J. FIN. 353, 354 (2000).
164. Id. at 355; see April K. Rinne, An Analysis of the Treatment of Asset
Securitization under the Proposed Basel II Accord and the U.S. Banking
Agencies' Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) 5 (Apr. 23, 2004)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Tufts University), http://fletcher.tufts.edu/research/
2004/Rinne-April.pdf ('The securitization process . . . has the capacity to
significantly reduce an entity's overall risk profile and subsequently its capital
holding requirement. As a result, banks that engage in securitization are likely
to have lower capital ratios than banks with no securitization activities. In
turn, banks with lower capital ratios are likely to have a lower overall cost of
funds, which in turn will impact the banks' profitability and consumers' access
to credit.")
165. See, e.g., Wolfe, supra note 163; see also Eugene A. Imhoff, Jr., Asset
Securitization: Economic Effects and Accounting Issues, ACCT. HORIZONS, Mar.
1992, at 9-11.
166. See Hui (Hannah) Cao, Note, Asset Securitization: Is It a Resolution
Option for China's Non-Performing Loans?, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 565, 582
(2003).
167. See id.
168. See Edward J. Park, Comment, Allowing Japanese Banks to Engage in
Securitization: Potential Benefits, Regulatory Obstacles, and Theories for
Reform, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 723, 729 (1996). Proceeds of a securitization
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By securitizing such loans and removing these assets from
their balance sheets, the Originator limits any further
losses. 169 This is because any future losses will be limited to
the extent of credit enhancements provided by the
Originator.17 0 In disposing the NPAs in such a manner, the
transaction can influence the various key financial and accounting measures of
bank health such as Return on Assets (RoA), Return on Equity (RoE), as well as
Capital to Assets Ratio (CAR). Id. Securitization also makes it easier for the
banks to comply with the capital requirements under the Basel Accord capital
adequacy guidelines. Thus securitization can indeed help in more than one way.
See id. at 724, 728-729 ("Securitization has provided borrowers with lower
interest rates, investors with greater liquidity, banks with lower funding costs,
and the economy with a lower cost of capital."); see also JAMES A. ROSENTHAL &
JUAN M. OCAMPO, SECURITZATION OF CREDIT: INSIDE THE NEW TECHNOLOGY OF

FINANCE 12-23 (1988). Indeed, the prevalent view in India is that securitization
is a panacea of sorts. See Reserve Bank of India, REPORT OF THE IN-HOUSE
WORKING GROUP ON ASSET SECURITISATION, §3.20 (1999) (concluding the chapter
with a view that "[slecuritisation provides capital relief, improves market
allocation efficiency, improves the financial ratios of the FIs, can create a
myriad of cash flows for the investors, suits risk profile of a variety of
customers, enables the FIs to specialise in a particular activity, shifts the
efficient frontier to the left, completes the markets with expanded opportunities
for risk-sharing and risk-pooling, increases liquidity, facilitates asset-liability
management, and develops best market practices"). For further discussion of
how securitization activities may help banks realize more profits and enhance
their capital and financial ratios, see Shenker & Colletta, supra note 144, at
1395-96, 1396 n.131.
169. Securitization transactions where assets are removed from an
originator's balance sheet are called "true sale" securitizations or off-balance
sheet transactions. Under a true sale securitization, the transaction can be
treated as a "sale" of underlying assets. "Sale" may have different meaning for
accounting, taxation, and bankruptcy purposes. However, generally, the
transfer of assets must qualify as a sale of assets in the relevant jurisdiction
rather than a secured loan, thereby enabling the originator to remove these
assets from its balance sheet. See Shengzhe Wang, True Sale Securitization in
Germany and China, §1 n.1 (Dec. 15, 2004) (unpublished LLM thesis, Johann
Wolfgang Goethe University) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
170. See Cao, supra note 166, at 582. Such credit enhancements may take
various forms. See supra note 161. When underlying assets in a securitization
transaction are NPAs, usually an originator will have to provide some kind of
guarantee or credit enhancement to the transaction. This is so as to be able to
obtain a good rating from any of the rating agencies providing an opinion on the
transaction and hence be able to issue securities backed by these NPAs at a low
spread from risk free securities such as government treasury bonds. See Cao,
supra note 166, at 582. Credit rating agencies consider a number of factors in
rating a securitization transaction backed by NPAs. Among other criteria, some
important ones are (i) the nature of obligors i.e., quantitative and qualitative
characteristics of the obligor's credit worthiness; (ii) recovery rates of NPAs; (iii)
structural considerations like availability of liquidity facility and credit
enhancements. See Letter from Stephen W. Joynt, President and Chief
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are
risks and rewards of the underlying problem of NPAs
17
transferred and spread amongst market participants. 1
is
Commercial success of such securitizations
dependant on the assurance of a proper return to
investors. 172 In order to provide the return promised to the
investors, the servicer of the securities must be able to
extract sufficient value from either the asset pool or from
loan collaterals. 173 Further, in order to reach out to a large
number of investors with different risk appetites, it
becomes necessary to structure the deal in such a way so as
to cater to different classes of investors. 174 Finally, a crucial
issue is meeting the assurance of proper returns through
the ability to generate the predicted cash flows. 175 Because
NPAs by their very nature have high delinquency and
default rates, recovery of these loans--coming via
refinancing, restructuring, or liquidation, so as to generate
cash flows in a predicable manner-is an important factor
176
in meeting the need of assured returns for the investors.
With these constraints always on the horizon, the role of
the financial institution that
services the securities backed
by these NPAs is crucial. 177
Executive Officer, Fitch Ratings Inc, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission (Nov. 12, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/news/
extra/credrate/fitchratingsl.htm; see also Cao, supra note 166, at 583 & n.124;
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ ET AL., supra note 150, at 5.

171. Cao, supra note 165, at 582.
172. In other words, securities backed by non-performing loans must be able
to provide returns commensurate with the risk undertaken. See id. at 583.
173. See id.

174. See id. ("To attract investors with different risk appetites, an originator
may structure the transaction in a way that the same asset pool to generate
[sic] several classes of notes with hierarchical seniority and different credit
ratings").
175. See id.

176. See id. at 584.
177. See id. ("[T]he originator-service (usually a financial institution) plays
a key role in a distressed loan securitization .... [T]he originator is the entity
responsible for creating the asset pool from a suitable portfolio. In addition,
investors also rely heavily on the originator to channel the cash flow generated
from the asset pool to the SPV for interest distribution. Furthermore, the
originator often assumes the servicer's role given its experience and skills in
collecting debts and enforcing creditor's rights. In the event of loan defaults, the
originator should take the best course of action to maximize recoveries for the
investors' benefit. In servicing securities backed by distressed loans, the
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It is this particular constraint-banks' ability, or rather
inability, to extract value from the pledged collateral in the
event of a loan default-that hampered the Indian banking
sector's growth. As noted elsewhere, 178 the protracted legal
battles made it extremely difficult to foreclose on the
pledged collateral in the event of a default. This meant that
banks did not usually have the confidence to engage in such
a course. 179 Under these circumstances, the NPAs in the
Indian banking sector continued to grow.180 So when the
Indian government decided to legislate SARFAESI and
enhance creditors' rights, thereby making it easier for the
banks to be able to extract value from the pledged
collaterals, it killed several birds with a single stone. The
legislative response-passage of SARFAESI-and asset
reconstruction activities in India post-SARFAESI are
discussed next.
III. SARFAESI AS THE "MAGIC WAND"l 8 1-EXTRACTING
VALUE FROM NPAs
Under the legal system prevalent before the enactment
of SARFAESI, creditors could take possession of collateral
without the intervention of the courts only in certain
specific cases.18 2 SARFAESI changed that. SARFAESI is a

originator's main task is not one of selecting and monitoring loans that are
expected to be performing. Rather, the focus is on choosing weak loans with
good recovery prospects and on actively working with the defaulted borrowers,
the lending group, bankruptcy courts, and any other parties in order to
generate the necessary cash flow to service the required ABS payments. To
increase its ability to better service the asset pool(s), the originator may also
transfers [sic] a part of servicing function to a reliable outside specialist.")
(internal citations omitted).
178. See supraPart I.D; see also infra Part III.
179. See Anupam Srivastava, Guest Editorial:Analysis on SecuritisationAct
2002, http://www.helplinelaw.com/docs/sec-rec-f-assets/index.php;
see also
Ashwin Puri, Developing the Asian Markets for Non-Performing Assets, in
FORUM FOR ASIAN INSOLVENCY REFORM (FAIR): MAXIMIZING VALUE OF NONPERFORMING
ASSETS
3
(Nov.
10-11,
2003),
available
at
http://www.helplinelaw.com/docs/sec-rec-f-assets/index.php
("Creditor's rights
have historically been difficult to enforce in India, often involving long winded
court procedures.").
180. See supranote 79.
181. Suryanarayana & Sivaramakrishnan, supra note 81, at 1.
182. See infra note 193, and accompanying text.
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broad piece of legislation 8 3 with a three-pronged
8 5 to
approach. 8 4 It makes it easier for the Secured Creditor
enforce its Security Interest; 8 6 it provides for the transfer
of NPAs 187 to the ARCs1 88 so that the ARCs can dispose of
them and realize the proceeds; 8 9 and finally it provides for

183. See Anand, supra note 155 ("In this Act [SARFAESI], the provisions of
securitization have been clubbed with provisions of asset reconstruction and
enforcement of security interest. Though these provisions are heterogeneous in
nature, one thing that is common to them is that they are related to banks and
financial institutions.").
184. See Srivastava, supra note 179.
185. Under SARFAESI,
[A] "Secured Creditor" means any bank or financial institution or any
consortium or groups of banks or financial institutions and includes:
(i) debenture trustee appointed by bank or financial institution; or
(ii) securitisation company or reconstruction company; or
(iii) any other trustee holding securities . . . in whose favour security
interest is created for due repayment by any borrower of any financial
assistance.
§2(1)(zd).
186. Under SARFAESI,
"[S]ecurity interest" means right, title and interest of any kind
whatsoever upon property, created in favour of any secured creditor
and includes any mortgage charge, hypothecation, assignment other
than those specified in section 31.
§2(1)(zf).
Exceptions provided under section 31 deal with liens on goods, movables,
aircrafts and marine vessels, as well as provide relief for agricultural and other
small borrowers. For a discussion of how SARFAESI allows for easier recovery
process in the event of loan default, see infra Part III.B.
187. Under SARFAESI, a non-performing asset, or NPA, is "an asset or
account of a borrower, which has been classified by a bank of [sic] financial
institution as sub-standard, doubtful or loss asset, in accordance with the
directions or guidelines relating to asset clarifications issued by the Reserve
Bank." § 2(1)(o).
188. Under SARFAESI, "'reconstruction company' means a company formed
and registered under the Companies Act, 1956 for the purpose of asset
reconstruction," and 'securitisation company' means any company formed and
registered under the Companies Act, 1956 for the purpose of securitisation." §§
2(1)(v), (za).
189. Under SARFAESI, "'asset reconstruction' means acquisition by any
securitisation company or reconstruction company of any right or interest of
any bank or financial institution in any financial assistance for the purpose of
realisation of such financial assistance." § 2(1)(b).
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"a legal framework for securitisation of assets."'190 Part A
explains the regulatory scheme embodied in SARFAESI
that allows for creating asset-backed securities based on
NPAs and how it is being used to extract value from NPAs.
Part B addresses some of the potential problem areas in
SARFAESI that may derail this experimentation.
A. Asset Reconstruction and Securitizationunder

SARFAESI
The Government of India promulgated SARFAESI as a
broadside attack on the NPAs problem in India. To achieve
the desired results, the Government of India included in
SARFAESI not only a framework for regulating
securitization activities in India, 191 but also a restructured
"framework of debt workouts in favour of lenders and
against the borrowers." 192 Thus, the Indian government
worked to close the legal loopholes that had earlier made it
difficult for the banks to extract value from the pledged
collateral in the event of default, 193 and to allow willing
counterparties to share the risk associated with NPAs.
190. Srivastava, supra note 179.
191. See SARFAESI pmbl ("An ordinance to regulate securitisation and
reconstruction of financial assets and enforcement of security interest and for
matters connected therewith or incidental thereto."). It is interesting to note
how Indian lawmakers have defined securitization. According to the definitions
adopted by SARFAESI, "'securitisation' means acquisition of financial assets by
any securitisation company or reconstruction company from any originator,
whether by raising of funds by such securitisation company or reconstruction
company from qualified institutional buyers by issue of security receipts
representing undivided interest in such financial assets or otherwise." § 2(1)(z).
192. C.P. Chandrasekhar, NPAs in India's Banks: Debt Default as Strategy,
May 19, 2003, http://www.macroscan.org/cur/may03/print/prntl90503NPA.htm.
This is because, as noted previously, under the provisions of SICA, the
companies had the option to take refuge under the BIFR, which would keep
lenders away in spite of default. See id.
193. See infra Part III.A. The governing law in such cases remained The
Transfer of Property Act, 1882, No. 4 (as amended) ("The Transfer of Property
Act"). Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that:
A mortgagee, or any person acting on his behalf, shall, subject to
provisions of this section, have power to sell or concur in selling
mortgaged property, or any part thereof, in default of payment of
mortgage-money, without the intervention of the Court, in
following cases and in no others, namely:-(a) where the mortgage is an English mortgage

the
the
the
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Under SARFAESI, if a loan becomes non-performing,
the secured creditor may, by providing a notice of sixty
days, become entitled to exercise the rights available to it
under SARFAESI. 194 SARFAESI provides that upon
receiving such notice, if the borrower fails to discharge its
liability in full, the secured creditor may take possession of
the secured asset, or may take over the management of the
secured asset by appointing a manager. 195 However, in case

(b) where a power of sale without the intervention of the Court is
expressly conferred on the mortgagee by the mortgage-deed and the
mortgagee is the Government;
(c) where a power of sale without the intervention of the Court is
expressly conferred on the mortgagee by the mortgage-deed and the
mortgaged property or any part thereof was, on the date of the
execution of the mortgage-deed, situate[d] within the towns of
Calcutta, Madras, Bombay or in any other town or area which the
State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify
in this behalf.
The "English mortgage" mentioned here is the kind of mortgage in which the
mortgagor promises to repay the borrowed funds on a specific date, and as
collateral transfers the mortgaged property "absolutely to the mortgagee,"
however, with the provision that the mortgagee will re-transfer the property to
the mortgagor upon payment of the borrowed funds as agreed. See Anupam
Srivastava, supra note 179. These regulations meant that for all practical
purposes, the only route available to banks to foreclose on the pledged collateral
was to enforce their rights through the slow and long-drawn out process in the
courts. See id.
194. SARFAESI provides that:
Where any borrower, who is under a liability to a secured creditor
under a security agreement, makes any default in repayment of
secured debt is classified by the secured creditor as non-performing
asset, then the secured creditor may require the borrower by notice in
writing to discharge in full his liabilities to the secured creditor within
sixty days from the date of notice failing which the secured creditor
shall be entitled to exercise all or any of the rights under sub-section
(4).
§ 13(2).
195. Under SARFAESI,
In case the borrower fails to discharge his liability in full within the
period specified in sub-section (2), the secured creditor may take
recourse to one or more of the following measures to recover his
secured debt, namely:(a) take possession of the secured assets of the borrower including the
right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the
secured asset;
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multiple secured creditors are owed debt by the borrower,
such rights cannot be exercised by these creditors unless
secured creditors with rights to three-fourths of the
outstanding debt agree to an action. 196 SARFAESI further
makes such an action binding on all the secured
197
creditors.
For promoting asset-backed securities based on NPAs,
SARFAESI permits setting up of ARCs to take over the
NPAs that have accumulated in the Indian banking
sector. 198 However, SARFAESI does not allow the Banks' 99

(b) take over the management of the secured assets of the borrower
including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale and
realise the secured asset;
(c) appoint any person (hereafter referred to as the manager), to
manage the secured assets the possession of which has been taken over
by the secured creditor;
(d) require at any time by notice in writing, any person who has
acquired any of the secured assets from the borrower and from whom
any money is due or may become due to the borrower, to pay the
secured creditor, so much of the money as is sufficient to pay the
secured debt.
§ 13(4).
196. SARFAESI, § 13(9) provides that:
In the case of financial [sic] of a financial asset by more than once [sic]
secured creditors or joint financing of a financial asset by secured
creditors, no secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise any or all of
the right [sic] conferred on him under or pursuant to sub-section (4)
unless exercise of such right is agreed upon by the secured creditors
representing not less than three-fourth in value of the amount
outstanding as on a record date and such action shall be binding on all
the secured creditors.

§ 13(9).
197. See id.
198. See Lakshmi Mohandas, Securitisation, BSE ANN. CAP. MKT. REV. '03
114 (2003), http://www.bseindia.com/downloads/Securitisation.pdf.
199. Under SARFAESI, a .'bank means - (i) a banking company: [sic] or (ii)
a corresponding new bank; or (iii) the State Bank of India; or (iv) a subsidiary
bank; or (v) such other bank which the Central Government may, by
notification, specify for the purposes of this Ordinance." § 2(1)(c).
Furthermore, the "banking company" referred to in this definition has "the
meaning "assigned to it in clause (c) of section 5 of the Banking Regulation Act,
1949." § 2(1)(d). According to the Banking Regulation Act, No. 10 of 1949, a
banking company is "any company which transacts the business of banking" in
India. § 3(c).
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and various Financial Institutions 200 to create special
asset
and
for
securitization
purpose
vehicles 201
reconstruction transactions. Instead, banks and financial
institutions may set up ARCs.202 ARCs are required to
maintain a capital adequacy ratio of at least fifteen percent
of their total risk weighted assets. 20 3 Further, any ARC
the
seeking registration with the RBI is required to own
20 4
fund of at least two crore rupees (Rs. Twenty Million).
ARCs may purchase NPAs from banks and financial
institutions and then set up one or more trusts to issue
Security Receipts. 20 5 Under SARFAESI, such sales may
occur on "without recourse" basis or "with recourse" basis.
200. Under SARFAESI,
'Financial Institutions' means (i) a public financial institution within the meaning of section 4A of the
Companies Act, 1956;
(ii) any institution specified by the Central Government under sub.
Clause (ii) of clause (h) of section 2 of the Recovery of Debts Due to
Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993;
(iii) International Finance Corporation established under the
International Finance Corporation (Status, Immunities and Privileges)
Act, 1958;
(iv) Any other institution or non-banking financial company as defined
in clause (f) of section 45-1 of the Reserve Bank of India 'Act, 1934,
which the Central Government may, by notification, specify as
financial institution for the purposes of this Ordinance.
§2 (1)(m).
201. See supra Part II.A.
202. See SARFAESI § 3.
203. See SARFAESI § 3(1)(B).
204. See id.
205. According to SARFAESI, "'security receipt' means a receipt or other
security, issued by a securitisation company or reconstruction company to any
qualified institutional buyer pursuant to a scheme, evidencing the purchase or
acquisition by the holder thereof, of an undivided right, title or interest in the
financial asset involved in securitization." § 2(1)(zg). Compare these definitions
with the ones used in Regulation AB, 70 Fed. Reg. 1506, 1508 (Jan. 7, 2005) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 210, 228-229, 232, 239, 240, 242, 245, and 249). In
addition, in stressing that such securitized products can be marketed to only
sophisticated institutional investors, the "qualified institutional buyers,"
§ 2(1)(u); see also infra note 223, SARFAESI makes it very clear that such
instruments are outside the realm of public investing. This emphasis in
regulating who can invest in these sophisticated products is in sync with similar
emphasis in financially developed markets like the United States.
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However ARCs "pay" for such purchases, not in cash, but
rather by issuing security receipts to the banks for a
discounted value of the debt. 20 7 Although these security
receipts do not carry a fixed rate of interest or even a
repayment schedule, 208 in practical terms, the NPAs on the
banks' balance sheets are replaced by these debt securities,
which count as investments for regulatory purposes. 209 In
addition, the requirement for setting 21
aside
potential profits
0
as provisions for NPAs becomes moot.
206

B. Securitizing NPAs in India: PotentialProblems PostSARFAESI
In India, prior to SARFAESI, distribution of NPAs
remained skewed in favor of big borrowers. 211 Therefore, it
was not a surprise that, in response to the Indian
government's efforts to enhance creditors' rights, big
borrowers that had been reaping the benefits of a weak debt
recovery regime attacked the constitutional validity of

206. See RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, GUIDELINES TO BANK/FIs ON SALE OF
FINANCIAL ASSETS TO SECURITISATION COMPANY (SC)[RECONSTRUCTION COMPANY
(RC) (CREATED UNDER THE SECURITSATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF FINANCIAL
ASSETS AND ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY INTEREST ACT, 2002) AND RELATED
ISSUES-ANNEXURE, http://www.rbi.org.in/home.aspx. The guidelines suggest

that "without recourse" means that the "entire credit risk associated with the
financial assets [is] being transferred to SC/RC" and "with recourse" means that
upon non-realization, part of the assets will revert back to the seller bank or
financial institution. Id. § 4(a).
207. See SARFAESI § 5(1)(a); see also India's Credit Clean-up, THE BANKER,
(July 4,
2005,),
http://www.thebanker.com/news/printpage.php/aid/3030/
India'scredit-clean-up.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2006).
208. See India's Credit Clean-up, supra note 207.
209. See id.
210. See Chandrasekhar, supra note 192; see also Indian Bad-Debt Buyer
Awaits
Foreign
Funds,
REUTERS
(June
15,
2005),
http://arcil.co.in/ARCIL/HOME/ASP/ARCILNewsbrief.asp?MenuID=5&News_
ID=54 ("Provisioning is only helping the bank to the extent of removing the
weakness from the balance sheet. If you have a dirty room and you close the
door, the dirt doesn't go away; only maybe the foul smell doesn't spread in the
house." (quoting Rajendra Kakker, Chief Executive Officer, Asset
Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd.)).
211. Chandrasekhar, supra note 192; see also Time Running Out for Old
World Tycoons, Nov. 28, 2002, http://www.goodnewsindia.com/index.php/
Supplement/article/time-running-out-for-old-world-tycoons/.
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SARFAESI. 212 However, in Mardia Chemicals,213 the
Supreme Court of India rejected this attack on the
constitutionality of SARFAESI. In its judgment dated April
8, 2004, the Supreme Court of India ruled that, but for a
single provision, 214 SARFAESI was a constitutionally valid
215
act, thereby paving the way for easier recovery of NPAs.

212. See, e.g., Organo Chem. Indus. & ANR v. Union of India & ORS, 4
S.C.C. 573 (1979). In fact, post-SARFAESI, lobbying increased on behalf of
businesses in order to amend SARFAESI to distinguish between 'willful
defaulters' and 'honest failures."' Chandrasekhar, supra note 192.
213. Mardia Chems. Ltd. v. Union of India & ORS, 2004 LRI 2 364.
214. This particular provision in question, Section 17(1)-(2), provides that
(1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures
referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor
or his authorised officer under this Chapter, may prefer an appeal to
the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within
forty-five [days]. Of the claimed in the notice referred to in sub-section
(2) of section (13)
(2) Where an appeal is preferred by a borrower, such appeal shall not
be entertained by the Debts Recovery Tribunal unless the borrower has
deposited with the Debts Recovery Tribunal seventy-five per cent. of
the amount claimed in the notice referred to in sub-section (2) of
section 13: Provided that the Debts Recovery Tribunal may, for reasons
to be recorded in writing, waive or reduce the amount to be deposited
under this section.
SARFAESI §17(1)-(2).
The Supreme Court held that this particular remedy available under
SARFAESI violated the right of equality, but otherwise held SARFAESI to be
constitutionally valid. See Mardia Chems, 2 LRI at 2. This strengthened the
rights of secured creditors and positioned them to be able to recover on
defaulted loans by taking possession of the pledged security.
215. The Supreme Court's judgment in Mardia Chemicals led to the
promulgation of the Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts
Laws (Amendment) Ordinance of 2004, which became an Act of Parliament on
December 29, 2004, deemed effective retrospectively from November 11, 2004.
See The Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws
(Amendment) Act, 2004, No. 30 [hereinafter Security Interest Amendment Act].
Under the Security Interest Amendment Act, a borrower may appeal a bank's
actions before the DRTs without making the deposit as required originally
under SARFAESI. Further, DRTs must dispose of any such appeal within sixty
days of such application. Id. § 10(b)(5). This period may be increased up to four
months, at the discretion of DRT, provided the reasoning for such a decision is
recorded in writing. Id. If, however, the borrower is not satisfied with the DRT's
disposition, it may appeal the DRT decision to the Appellate Tribunal by
depositing "fifty per cent. [sic] of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed
by secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever
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However, challenges for securitizing NPAs go beyond the
decision in Mardia Chemicals. There are other systemic
deficiencies in India that may derail the whole
experimentation with securitization of NPAs.
Under existing law, asset reconstruction can be done by
the creditors once a loan becomes non-performing, or by the
ARC once it acquires the folio of NPAs from the creditors.
However, as a practical matter, asset reconstruction is done
by agencies separate from the banks upon acquiring the
portfolio of such assets. 216 This has created an issue of
competency as to who is best able to recover on the debts
owed to the banks. 217 The loan sides of the banks that are
most competent to understand the quality of these assets
because of their experience in handling these loans since
inception are removed from the process of reconstructing
these assets. The treasury sides of the banks that buy these
securities are traditionally not aware of the asset quality in
these folios and remain dependant on risk models that may
be far removed from reality.
There also exist several valuation issues while
reconstructing NPAs in India. This is because in the Indian
banking sector, provisioning requirements allowed the
banks an almost indefinite time frame to carry such NPAs
on their books. 2 18 For one, this means that different banks

is less: Provided also that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to be
recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five per
cent.[sic] of debt .

.

.

."

Id.

§ 12(a)(iii). Ultimately the Security Interest

Amendment Act has not dampened the intended effects of SARFAESI, and
banks expect that a majority of defaulters will "return to the negotiating table,"
thereby making the process of extracting value from NPAs smoother. Supreme
Court
Arms
the
Securitisation
Act,
Apr.
13,
2004,
http://www.goodnewsindia.com/index.php/Supplement/articles/supreme-courtarms-the-securitisation-act/PO/.
216. See, e.g.,
Asset
Reconstruction
Company
(India)
Limited,
http://arcil.co.in/arcil/home/asp/index.asp (last visited Jan. 2, 2006) [hereinafter
ARCIL].
217. But see Background of Arcil, http://arcil.co.in/ARCILIHOME/ASP/AR
CILAbout.asp?MenuID=2&SubMenuID=14 (last visited Mar. 6, 2006) ("ARCs
are established to acquire nonperforming assets (NPAs) from financial
institutions and banks with the objective of focused management of these assets
and maximization of recovery. Relieving institutions and banks of the burden of
NPAs should allow them to focus on core activities.").
218. Puri, supra note 179, at 4.
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provision differently for the same asset. 219 For another,
under SARFAESI, NPAs must be transferred to ARCs at
market values. 220 Because the amortization of losses that
may occur upon transfer of such NPAs is not permitted and
because current regulatory scheme does not compel the
banks
to transfer their NPAs, banks may be reluctant to do
1
so.

22

Lack of secondary trading capability in the debt
markets restricts active trading of the NPAs based assetbacked securities, leading to sub-optimal distribution of
risks. This is because banks and financial institutions that
have NPAs on their balance sheets are also doubling up as
investors. 222 Given the complexity of instruments backed by
NPAs, such investments can be made only by Qualified
Institutional Buyers. 223 While the RBI has taken an active
role in realizing this constraint and is seeking to increase
the number of potential buyers for such assets, 224 the

219. See id.

220. RBI issues guidelines pursuant to SARFAESI to allow for transfer of
assets to ARCs.
221. Although admittedly, this is more of a theoretical argument and its
practical effects have not been visible so far. See, e.g., Indian Bad-Debt Buyer
Awaits Foreign Funds, supra note 210 ("ARCIL paid $825 million for $3.7
billion worth of industrial bad loans from it main shareholders, ICICI Bank,
State Bank of India and Industrial Development Bank of India. It hopes to
nearly double its NPA book by March 2006.").
222. Id. ('The banks and financial institutions are also doubling as
investors,' he told Reuters. 'We have got a buyer, we have got a seller, it so
happens that the seller is the loan side of the same institution and the buyer is
the treasury side."' (quoting Rajendra Kakker, Chief Executive Officer, Asset
Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd.)).
223. Under SARFAESI,
'Qualified Institutional Buyer' means a financial institution, insurance
company, bank, state financial corporation, state industrial development
corporation, trustee or any asset management company making
investment on behalf of mutual fund or provident fund or gratuity fund or
pension fund or a foreign institutional investor registered under the
Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 or regulations made
thereunder, or any other body corporate as may be specified by the Board.

§ 2(1)(u).
224. RBI issued new guidelines in July 2005 permitting banks to sell their
folios of NPAs to other financial entities, including banks, financial institutions,
and non-banking financial institutions, operating in India. See RESERVE BANK
OF INDIA, REPORT ON TREND AND PROGRESS OF BANKING IN INDIA, 2004-2005.
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current regulatory regime does not facilitate such
transactions for multiple reasons. For one, foreign
institutional investment is still constrained. 225 For another,
although banks are permitted to buy and sell NPAs to other
226
banks, such transactions must include cash consideration
and can take place only after NPAs have been held by the
banks for at least fifteen months. 227 This implies that
although the banks have at least two options to choose from
when deciding which route to take to dispose of their NPAs,
one option is significantly less attractive from the buyers'
perspective. 228 Further, because of the requirement 229
that
it
NPAs be classified as such for at least two years,
increases the costs
to
the
banks
because
of
the
provisioning
23 0
requirements.

CONCLUSION

In shaping its most comprehensive response to date to
the problem of NPAs in the form of securitization
legislation, India has taken a well-trodden path.231 While
225. See Price Waterhouse Coopers, NPL Asia, Nov. 2005, at 2 (explaining
that competition among foreign banks with licensed banking operations in India
for buying folios of NPAs is "somewhat limited pending foreign investment
liberalization").
226. Id. (explaining RBI guidelines of July 2005).
227. Id.
228. July 2005 RBI guidelines provide that, among other things,
1.

Loans must be classified as NPLs for at least 2 years

2.

Consideration must be in cash

3.

NPLs cannot be resold by the buyer before 15 months

4.

If purchased by a bank, the NPLs will be treated as standard
assets in the bank's books for 90 days, after which asset
classification would depend on recovery with reference to the
cash flows estimated.
Id. Therefore, a buyer must provide cash for acquiring the folio of NPAs,
making it a drain on the buyer's capital reserves.
229. Id.
230. The current guidelines provided by the RBI, purchasing banks must
ensure compliance with prudential credit exposure ceilings. See RESERVE BANK
OF INDIA, supra note 224, at 36.
231. For example, in the United States, after the savings and loan debacle of
the 1980s, Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) was formed, Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L.
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Indian experimentation in enhancing creditors' rights, and
thereby creating an environment for developing an assetbacked securities market based on NPAs has potential
problems, it has given two important results. First, it has
boosted banks' health, 232 and secondly, it has helped, if only
in a miniscule way, in the development of a stronger debt
market 233 which is necessary to provide the "spare tire" for
No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 184 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.), to "manage and resolve all cases involving depository institutions" and
thus recover on the assets of the failed S&Ls. See Alvin K. Lim, The S&L Crisis
Revisited: Exporting an American Model to Resolve Thailand's Banking
Problems, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 343, 354 (1998). Various east-Asian
countries have dealt with their banks' non-performing loans in a similar
fashion. Some examples include South Korea, see, e.g., Jong-Goo Yi, Trends and
Issues in Securitizatioin in Korea, INT'L FIN. L. REV. 2425 (Apr. 1, 2001),
available at 2001 WL 15390492, Japan, see, e.g., Yoshiki Shimada & Shinji Itoh,
Japanese Asset Securitization:A Guide For Practitioners,38 HARV. INT'L L.J.
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The decline in NPAs has also been evidenced across bank groups,
except in 2000-01. In line with this declining trend, NPAs declined
sharply in 2002-03, reflecting, inter alia, the salutary impact of earlier
measures towards NPA reduction and the enactment of the SARFAESI
Act ensuring prompter recovery without intervention of court or
tribunal. The progress under this Act has been significant, as
evidenced by the fact that during 2002-03, reductions outpaced
addition, especially for PSBs and reflected in an overall reduction of
non-performing loans to 9.4 per cent of gross advances from 14.0 per
cent in 1999-2000.
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Therefore, Indian policy makers have given

a strong impetus to the long term health of its economy by
venturing in the direction of removing the reliance of its
fast growing economy on bank lending. In addition, as the
health of the banking sector improves, increased
availability of credit should boost investments and economic
vitality. Under these circumstances, perhaps the Indian
response, even if it is an elephant's tale, is best described as
such because of its comprehensiveness, amounting to
majesty and grace, rather than inertia on the part of Indian
policymakers.

because securitized assets cannot be evaluated and priced without a liquid
"plain vanilla" asset in the market. "Plain vanilla" assets are straight bonds
characterized by bullet payments, fixed coupons, and, in contrast to securitized
assets, single obligors with clean credit structures and payment structures.
Once a market for plain vanilla securities is in place, it is possible to build
complex markets such as securitization on top of it.").
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19,1999), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1999/
19991019. A strong local bond market results in more efficient allocation of
resources as it matches borrowers and savers directly. Further, local bond
markets work efficiently in allowing the borrowers to use capital that is tailored
to their assets and operations. See Assad Jabre, supra note 14, at 48-56.

